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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Caitlin Turner Robertson 
 
Master of Science 
 
Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program 
 
September 2012 
 
Title: Freedom of Conscience v. Required Taxation: Exploring the Conflict 
Transformation Agency of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act 
 
Refusing to participate in war does not only mean refusing to serve in the 
military.  For many conscientious objectors, it means refusing to pay taxes that directly 
support the military industrial complex. Conscientious tax objectors risk many 
punishments by withholding tax money that supports war.  Politico-social conflicts exist 
between a citizen’s legal obligation to pay taxes and the personal obligation to her/his 
moral beliefs. My research suggests that the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act 
(RFPTFA) may be one transformative agent for this conflict.   
Through examination of relevant case law, statutes, conflict transformation 
literature, and interviews with conscientious tax objectors, my investigation concludes 
that members of the conscientious tax objector movement disagree on the merits of 
RFPTFA.  My research suggests that until these various intermovement factions enter 
into consensus-building dialogue, conscientious tax objection will remain a mere 
symbolic method of pacifism rather than a powerful tool in the art of peacebuilding.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 If you work for peace, stop paying for war.  I read this slogan on a bumper sticker 
attached to a bicycle parked at the Friends Meeting House in Eugene, Oregon, during the 
fall of 2008.  I was at the meetinghouse preparing to attend my first National War Tax 
Resistance Coordinating Committee’s (N.W.T.R.C.C.) Annual Gathering.  After reading 
the slogan I thought to myself- I do work for peace, am I paying for war?  My bumper 
sticker moment was only the first of many eye-opening experiences I encountered at the 
annual gathering.  Examining The War Resisters League’s U.S. Federal Budget Pie Chart 
(See Appendix A) remains for me the most powerful perspective changer. 
 Viewing the pie chart marked by two areas, a pink area (Military) and a black area 
(Non-Military), which symbolize unbalanced fiscal allocations, the effects of the resource 
distribution became apparent.  The United States Federal Government allocates 48% of 
all Federal income tax dollars to past and present Military spending thus leaving only 
52% of all Federal income tax dollars to pay for life-affirming expenditures through 
agencies like: Health and Human Services, the Social Security Administration, Food and 
Nutritional programs, Housing and Urban Development, and Environmental Protection to 
name a few (War Resisters League, 2012).  Many at the gathering repeated the same 
statement, “Imagine the needs that are unmet because of our government’s allocation of 
resources.”   It slowly became apparent to me that the Federal income tax paid by 
individuals is essential to the continuance of the depravity of war.   
 Once I better understood the allocation and distribution of Federal income tax 
dollars, I realized that the bumper sticker was speaking to me.  I do work for peace and 
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obviously I, like most working individuals in the United States who have a Federal 
income tax liability, pay for war.  Ignorance, for me, was truly bliss.  As I began to know 
more I wanted to act better and to do better.  Next I asked, what can I do?  How can I, 
who works and prays for peace, not pay for war?  At the gathering and later during 
conversations with prominent peace activists the answers remained the same- resist war 
taxes and become a conscientious tax objector.  Besides those two answers, I heard from 
a few activists, a third, perhaps more conciliatory approach, support the Religious 
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act. This third answer ultimately provided the impetus for my 
thesis.  As I researched The Fund I became increasingly aware of the conflicted nature of 
the conscientious tax objector movement.  While pursuing the question of why does the 
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act receive little congressional support and produce 
nominal results, I ultimately focused my attention on the conflict within the movement.  
 
1.1. Purpose of Study 
 Paying taxes that are used for war has long been a vexing problem for those whose 
conscience forbids direct participation in war. If it is wrong to take up arms and kill, then 
is it not equally wrong to provide the means for another to commit the same acts? A 
conventional escape from this dilemma is found in the legal obligation to pay taxes. 
Payment is compelled, not voluntary, and thus one’s conscience remains clear; but 
conscientious tax objectors argue otherwise.  In this thesis, I develop the concept of 
freedom of conscience at conflict with required taxation.  The concept is developed 
through a conflict transformation case study that examines how the components of 
conscience, the common good, and conflict transformation are in conversation.  My study 
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shows how the conscientious tax objector movement
1
 is a microcosm of the complex 
interactions alive within a democracy.   
 Freedom of conscience was a core ideology of the founders of the United States of 
America. Most colonial governments had mechanisms for objection to conscription due 
to moral conscience. (National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee, 2004) 
Many, including members of the Religious Society of Friends, Mennonite, and Church of 
the Brethren, immigrated in order to escape persecution for their refusal to participate in 
any kind of warfare (National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee, 2004).  Yet, 
during the First World War, many conscientious objectors were imprisoned and 
persecuted for these beliefs. The United States Congress passed legislation in 1940 
establishing alternative service for drafted conscientious objectors. (Seeley, 1994) 
However, for many conscientious objectors, using their tax dollars to fund war is as 
reprehensible as being compelled to participate in war. Conscientious tax objectors risk 
fines, wage garnishment, property seizures, and jail sentences by withholding tax money 
that supports war. Political and social conflicts exist between the legal obligation of a 
citizen to pay taxes and the personal obligation to uphold her/his moral beliefs (Lull, 
1979)(National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee, 2008).   
 My case study was conducted through an examination of relevant case law, statutes, 
conflict transformation literature, a series of informal conversations, and formal 
interviews with current and former conscientious tax objectors.  My investigation 
concludes that members of the conscientious tax objector movement are in conflict.  As 
John Paul Lederach (1995) suggests, conflicts are dialectic and, as such, cannot be 
                                                        
1
 For the purpose of clarity, in this thesis, tax resistance, war tax resistance, and conscientious tax resistance 
are all referred to as conscientious tax objection.   
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solved; but can be transformed.   My research suggests that the Religious Freedom Peace 
Tax Fund Act may be one possible transformative agent for this conflict.  
 
1.2. Freedom of Conscience in the United States  
 Democracy, as it is known in the United States of America, is rule by the majority.  
However, the voice of the minority is rarely silent.  Furthermore, in the era of the Occupy 
Movement 
2
 with such slogans as, “This is our county; we will occupy it.  These are our 
streets; we will occupy them.  We are here; we are growing.  We are the 99%,” the 
majority’s voice is increasingly represented.  Criticism, critique, and nonviolent civil 
disobedience are legally sanctioned democratic actions within the United States of 
America.  Moreover, the protection of the right to dissent and the right to voice that 
dissent are constitutionally protected by the Constitution. (United States Constitution 
amendment I) 
 One such legally protected act of dissention is the right to conscientiously object to 
war.  The Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, provides in part that, 
“no person will be subjected to combatant training and service in the U.S. armed forces if 
that person, owing to religious training and belief, is opposed to participating in war in 
any form” (50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j)).  Further, conscientious objectors (COs) hold 
religious and/or secular convictions that all forms of war are morally wrong.  For the 
conscientious objector, this belief is not a temporary or insignificant belief, but one that 
compels her/ him into action.  In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,337 (1970), the 
                                                        
2
 The Occupy Movement, according to its website is, “a leaderless resistance movement with people of 
many colors, genders and political persuasions.  The one thing we all have in common is that We Are The 
99% that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%” (OccupyWallStreet, 2012).  
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Court describes that belief as, “their objection to participating in war in any form can not 
be said to come from a ‘still, small voice of conscience;’ rather, for them that voice was 
so loud and insistent that [they] preferred to go to jail rather than serve in the Armed 
Forces” (Welsh v. United States, 1970). 
 However, refusing to participate in war in any form does not only mean refusing to 
serve in the military; for many conscientious objectors, it means refusing to pay taxes that 
directly support the military industrial complex
3
.   Many conscientious objectors, because 
of their deeply held religious and ethical beliefs, have heard a clarion call to refuse to pay 
taxes that support war.  As one conscientious tax objector who lives in Eugene, Oregon 
told me over coffee, “I believe that it is immoral to pay someone to do an action that I 
believe is immoral.  War is immoral, I refuse to participate in war and that means that I 
refuse to pay taxes that pay for war” (Conscientious tax objector #2, personal 
communication, 4 December 2011).  A logical consequence of opposing war is refusing 
to pay a tax that directly supports it. Her stated beliefs put her in good company.
4
   A. J. 
Muste in Muste vs. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 913, 916 (1961) claimed that,  
The same reason that would prevent [a conscientious objector] from firing a gun at 
an enemy and would prevent him from thinking he was exonerated from guilt if he 
handed the gun and ammunition to another solider to use, would also keep him 
from paying the money to make the guns and ammunition. (Muste v. 
Commissioner, 1961) 
                                                        
3
 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his Farewell Address on 17 January 1961, introduced the phrase, The 
Military Industrial Complex.  Eisenhower gave a dire warning to the nation and described how the 
formidable union of defense contractors and the armed forces were a threat to democratic government. 
(National Public Radio, 2011) 
 
4
 According to this author.  
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Likewise in his critically important book for Christian conscientious tax objectors, The 
Tax Dilemma, Donald Kaufman (1978) goes further and states that it, 
Seems artificial to distinguish between being a military warrior and paying 
government for the implements of war.  Is it any wonder that people are agonized 
by the contradictions of paying for war while praying for peace?  To insist on 
personally abstaining from war while paying for it with taxes suggests an ethical 
inconsistency.  To finance and pay for an activity, is to participate in it. (p. 21) 
 
 Earlier, I stated that the First Amendment specifically protects the voice of the 
minority dissenter.  How is it then that the minority voice faces punishment for dissenting 
when the dissent is in the form of refusal to pay taxes that support actions considered by 
the dissenter to be immoral?  The answer rests with the Supreme Court and its continued 
deference to revenue statutes.  Beginning with Nicol vs. Ames 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1898) 
the Court stated that 
The power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is 
based.  It is as necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation as is the air he 
breathes to the natural man.  It is not only the power to destroy, but it is also the 
power to keep alive. (Nicol v. Ames, 1898) 
 
The Nicol Court decision claimed that without the power to tax, a government would not 
survive.  If the Court has routinely rejected
5
 First Amendment challenges to general taxes 
                                                        
5
 See for example, United States vs. Lee (1982) which I will explain in further detail in Chapter 2, and 
Hernandez vs. Commissioner, (1988) in which the Court ruled that auditing courses at the Church of 
Scientology was not a qualified deduction and that this non-deductibility of payments did not violate the 
Establishment and/ or Free Exercise Clauses.   
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because of the presumed importance of the country’s need for revenue, then is there a 
way to permit sincere conscientious objectors to pay their full tax obligation without 
violating deeply held religious or ethical beliefs? 
 
1.3. Case Study  
For conscientious tax objectors a major challenge exists.  Under the current law, 
there is no legal way to honor her/ his conscience and legally comply with the tax law 
besides earning less than the federal taxable income level.  To date, few scholars have 
sought to explain this circumstance in any systematic way. Most of the literature about 
the conflict is: relevant case law that emphasizes the constitutionality of the challenge 
(United States v. Ramsey, Adams vs. Commissioner, Jenkins vs. Commissioner, Wall vs. 
United States, and United States vs. Peister), discusses the normative implications of 
interpreting the religious freedom in the United States Constitution’s First Amendment 
(Segers & Jelen, 1998), or is a compilation of essays in support of a peace tax trust fund 
idea (Franz, Bassett, Ratzlaff, & Godshall, 2009).   Thus, the challenge is to craft a statute 
that will enable the conscientious tax objector to follow her/ his own conscience without 
compromising the viability of the current federal tax system.  The Religious Freedom 
Peace Tax Fund Act (H.R. 1191, in the 112th Congress), a legislatively-created peace 
trust fund, is one such device.  In this thesis, I examine the history of The Conscientious 
Objector Movement, The Conscientious Tax Objector Movement, and then unpack the 
pros and cons, as shared with me by individual conscientious tax objectors, to enacting 
the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act (see Appendix B for a copy of the bill and 
Chapter III for a synopsis of the history of the bill). 
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1.4. Barriers to Freedom of Conscience: An Organizing Theme  
 There are pros and cons, as seen by conscientious tax objectors, to the Religious 
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act. In Chapter IV I discuss in detail reasons why certain 
conscientious tax objectors support and conversely some conscientious tax objectors 
oppose the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act.  In general, the conscientious tax 
objectors who support the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act see the bill as one part 
of a greater peacebuilding movement.  In contrast, many conscientious tax objectors who 
do not support the bill express concern about the purpose and details of the bill.  
Specifically, many question the compliant nature of its approach.  These factions within 
the movement are in conflict.  In my thesis, I will discuss how relevant case law, the 
history of the conscientious objector movement, the history of the conscientious tax 
objector movement, and the factions within the movement all contribute to the current 
conflict between freedom of conscience and required taxation.  In short, my thesis 
examines how the current state of freedom of conscience and required taxation are in 
conflict. 
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CHAPTER II 
SETTING THE STAGE 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the ways that the United States 
Federal and State courts treat religion in the public domain.  The Court’s tendency to treat 
religion as a private, individual concern has numerous consequences for religious 
freedom, specifically, with regards to the conflict between required taxation and freedom 
of conscience.  I will discuss both the positive and negative consequences of this 
tendency.  Then, I will briefly discuss relevant case law.  Finally, I will transition from 
relevant case law to relevant statutory authority.  Congress’ legislative authority 
regarding freedom of conscience is equally worth unpacking with regards to religious 
freedom.  
 
2.1. Theoretical Religious Freedoms and The Supreme Court 
 I preface this section with the caveat that summarizing the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on religious freedom is extremely difficult.  What you will read below is 
not an exhaustive review and summary of the full topic.  Simply, it is an introduction to 
the topic through my own conflict resolution lens.  A very broad outline of the Court’s 
perceived religious bias follows.  
 The Court assumes that religion is a matter of private concern (Turpin, 2012).  
Thomas Jefferson (1813) wrote that religion is a relationship between “a man and his 
maker” (Jefferson, 1813). Katherine Turpin further suggests that Protestantism has 
dominated the public discourse since the beginning of the republic (Turpin, 2012).   I 
suggest that the Court reads the First Amendment through a Protestant lens of private 
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concern.  While the First Amendment protects the private beliefs of citizens, the Court 
has argued that it confers no rights upon the believer to act upon those beliefs (Reynolds 
v. United States, 1879)
6
.  Stanley Hauerwas’ (2012) theory of religion being relegated to 
the “sphere of private inwardness and individual motivation” as a crucial aspect of a 
modern liberal society is extremely useful because it sheds light on the difficult problem 
of if religion is private, as the Court has argued, then the state cannot recognize religious 
beliefs per se.  Recognizing certain individual religious beliefs, the Court argues, would 
discriminate against individual citizens by either favoring or disfavoring religious beliefs 
in violation of the demands of the equal protection of law.   
 However, the United States is a religiously diverse pluralistic country. The Court 
recognizes this reality.  In order to avoid favoring one group over another, the Court has 
maintained the traditional liberal view that Cavanaugh (1999) suggests is that the state 
must remain strictly secular.  Only accepting secular arguments as valid the Court 
believes is fair and equitable.  Further, by avoiding arguments specifically related to 
dogma and doctrine, the Court remains neutral regarding particular faith traditions.   
 By maintaining a strict separation between religion and state the Court often fails 
to recognize that this treatment is itself discriminatory, as in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971
7
.  
                                                        
6
 George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, challenged the federal 
anti-bigamy statute. He was convicted in a Utah Territorial District Court and the Utah Territorial Supreme 
Court affirmed his conviction.  The Court held that the statute can punish criminal activity without regard 
to religious belief. Furthermore, the First Amendment protected religious belief, but it did not protect 
religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy.  
 
7
 A Pennsylvania statue provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional 
materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. A Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental 
salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-
related educational institutions."  Chief Justice Burger created the three-part test for laws dealing with 
religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must 
have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessive 
government entanglement with religion." The Court found that subsidizing parochial schools furthered a 
process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the 
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Maintaining strict separation, the Court argues, is necessary to preserve religious 
freedom.  However, the Court’s historical understanding of religion preferences a 
particular religious bias, a Protestant private personal faith.  Moreover, by maintaining as 
Turpin (2012) suggests the dominant culture’s Protestant understanding of religion, the 
Court codifies discrimination against religious minorities.  The Court has traditionally 
been composed of members of the dominant majority culture
8
, and, as such, the Justices 
may often not be aware of the assumptions inherent in their arguments.  However, the 
religious minority cultures are aware of these assumptions and suffer discrimination due 
to the assumptions of the majority. Complaints and litigation by people of religious 
minority faiths reveal the effects of the majority’s discriminatory assumptions.   
Specifically, the most significant complaints regarding taxation include a belief that the 
current jurisprudence is religiously biased.  My research suggests that conscientious tax 
objectors feel that the Court allows religious discrimination against those people of faith 
whom are called to publicly witness their objection to war (Conscientious tax objector #1, 
personal communication, December 4, 2011). 
 By using the supra definition of religion by Thomas Jefferson, the court is partial.  
Defining religion as a matter of private concern may privilege the particular theology of 
the dominant culture.
9
 The Court’s opinion in US vs. Seeger10 attempts to soften this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The Court also noted 
the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation which appropriates support 
to religious schools.  (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971) 
 
8
 The religious composition of all the Supreme Court Justices is: Catholic: 12, Unitarian: 10, Jewish: 7, No 
Church: 1, Episcopalian,: 35, Presbyterian: 19, Other Protestant: 28. (Totenberg, 2010) 
 
9
 The theology of traditional mainline Protestantism as well as liberal Judaism (Niehbuhr, 1951)    
 
10
 See a short explanation of this court case later in this chapter.  
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concern.  However, the Court continues to preference the doctrinal belief of the isolated 
person exercising a very private spiritual experience.  The dominant culture’s Protestant 
theology that salvation is attained by faith alone and without the need to act out or 
express the belief in public continues to guide the Court jurisprudence.   
 The definition of faith, in which spirituality is inherently private, preferences the 
dominant culture while discriminating against people of faith who define religion using a 
different perspective.  Because they do not conform to the Court’s model of religion, 
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent in Goldman v. Wienberger (1986),
11
 the minority 
cultures experience discrimination.  The individualistic, private religious view of the 
majority may not support or require participation in a public ritual, wearing a religious 
symbol in public, expressions of faith through social action, and I suggest conscientious 
tax objection.  The Court, I suggest, reads the First Amendment to protect the religious 
understanding of the majority rather than to protect the rights of the minority.  
 In Lemon vs. Kurtzman (1971), the Court argued that in order to avoid 
discrimination against religious believers and non-believers alike, the State must operate 
according to strict secular standards.   Moreover, the State must be able to justify its 
actions using secular reasoning.  Furthermore, individuals must be able to offer secular 
reasons to advocate their religious beliefs.  The Court presupposes that the secular is a 
religiously neutral concept.  By adopting the secular justification standard, the Court 
believes that it is providing a neutral ground for political engagement.  John Rawls 
                                                        
11
 In Goldman v. Wienberger (1986) a Jewish captain challenged the military dress code regulation that 
denied him the right to wear a yarmulke.  The Court rejected the Captain’s complaint on the basis that the 
dress code was religiously neutral.  However, Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, noted that the 
dress code favored the majority culture.  The dress code accommodated the type of religious modifications/ 
and/or wear that is common to the majority culture, Christian; it precludes or denies variations that would 
accommodate other religious (minority) traditions.   
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(1992) refers to secular reason as public reason.  By arguing that secular/public reasoning 
is accessible to any reasonable person and does not rely on religious tradition or beliefs, 
the Court again preferences the majority culture.  The Court’s belief that secular/public 
reason is equally accessible to the religious and non-religious person alike is an example 
of the discriminatory assumptions of the majority culture.  By demanding secular/public 
reason as the only allowed framework for arguments, the Court discriminates against 
religious minority cultures.   
 Rawls and other advocates of secular rational or public reason argue that the 
dialectic discussions between religious and non-religious can be translated into neutral 
language.  By focusing on the idea that common principles can be found using secular 
language that will transcend the conflicts, Rawls overlooks Carter’s (1993) suggestion 
that the process of translation favors worldviews that find secular arguments persuasive 
and thus inherently discriminate against religious people.  
 Is the Court justified in its privilege of secular reasoning?  Many people believe 
that religion is inherently divisive.  Michael McConnell (1999) suggests that,  
In the current political climate, many of the most heated political controversies 
involve a clash between largely religious forces of cultural traditionalism and 
largely secular forces of cultural deconstruction.  It would be difficult to say 
which side in these conflicts was more strident, more intolerant, or more 
absolutist.  (p. 649) 
However, will restricting religious participation end individuals bringing their passions to 
the political arena?  My research suggests that the effort to secularize the public sphere 
has alienated and discriminated against numerous individuals. The efforts to avoid 
  14 
passionate conflict by using “neutral” secular language have only served to define the 
differences.  By refusing to deconstruct majority assumptions, the Court has 
institutionalized persecution of religious minority individuals and groups.  
 Reynolds v. United States (1879) and Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) are two cases 
that illustrate the Court’s opinion that it is not possible to recognize individual religious 
beliefs without discriminating against other individual citizens.  Further in Lemon, the 
Court created a three-part test that shows how the Court favors secular arguments in order 
to maintain neutrality.   
 
2.2. Relevant Case Law Regarding Education and Religious Freedom 
 Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) is one of the preeminent Supreme Court cases 
regarding protection of religious freedom.  While Yoder initially answers the question of 
how, if at all, should the United States protect a minority religious group’s interest in 
regulating education standards for its minor members; the holding ultimately builds on 
the framework with which other religious freedom cases are argued (e.g. conscientious 
objectors and conscientious tax objectors).   
 
Wisconsin vs. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
 The State of Wisconsin had a requirement that all children be enrolled in school 
until the age of sixteen.  Three Amish families, from a newly established Amish 
community in New Glarus, Wisconsin, sued the state over this requirement.  Amish 
families traditionally removed their children from school after completing the eighth 
grade in order to comply with the central tenet of their faith to “not conform any longer to 
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the patterns of this world.”  (Romans 12:2).  Furthermore, in 1950, a selected group of 
Amish leaders in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, made a declaration regarding the faith’s 
position on public school attendance.  In it, the leaders stated that, “We believe that our 
children should be properly trained and educated for manhood and womanhood. We 
believe that they need to be trained in those elements of learning, which are given in the 
elementary schools. Specifically, we believe that our children should be trained to read, 
to write, and to cipher."   However, the leaders believed that additional schooling was 
harmful as it, "has a tendency to cultivate sentiment which may lead to a drifting away 
from the church" (Peters, 2003, p.28).   The School Board officials, citing their belief that 
the State of Wisconsin had an obligation to ensure that all students were educated until 
the age of sixteen, feared that if any exception were made to this rule, it would open the 
floodgates to many requests for similar exemptions.  This exception, in the opinion of the 
School Board official, places the state in the tenuous position of determining which 
religious requests were genuine and which were fraudulent.  Without such exemption, 
many Amish parents, typically the fathers, were convicted of violating the law.   
In the landmark case, Wisconsin vs. Yoder (1972), the Court held that the State 
was required to cooperate with Amish parents in providing alternatives to mandatory 
education requirements.  In Yoder, the Court held that the “paramount 
responsibility”(Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972) and interest of the State in universal education 
was not sufficient to justify the disregard of the Amish lifestyle and faith-based child-
rearing practices.  The opinion states, “the essence of all that has been said and written on 
the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served 
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion” (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
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1972).  The Court prohibited enforcement against the Amish of “the Wisconsin law 
[compelling] them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds 
with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs” (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972).  
 
2.3. Relevant Case Law Regarding Conscientious Objector Status and Religious 
Freedom 
 Since 1917, conscription laws have incorporated an exemption from serving in 
combat for all persons who claim the status of conscientious objector based upon their 
religious training and belief (Albernathy, 1989).  The nature of this statutory authority 
has allowed the Court to refrain from determining whether or not the Constitution 
requires conscription and or the accommodation of religious conscience objection.  
Ultimately, the Court has had to interpret the exemption as it is statutorily written and 
determine whether the statue violates the religion clauses of the Constitution by favoring 
or disfavoring a particular religion.   
 The following decisions illustrate that that in order to avoid the appearance of 
favoring a particular religious faith, the Court defines conscientious objection based upon 
a religious belief, as the statutory exemption is written.  Then the Court transitions and 
moves beyond the normative understanding of the definition of religion.  These decisions 
suggest that the Court acknowledges that one’s religious affiliation, defined in numerous 
ways, can serve to mediate between one’s civic obligation to serve in the military and 
conscience.  
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United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) 
 This case, heard by the Supreme Court, connected three cases involving 
conviction for failure to accept induction into the United States Armed Forces.  Three 
individuals, Arno Sascha Jakobson, Forest Britt Peter, and Daniel Andrew Seeger, all 
sought conscientious objector status without belonging to an orthodox religious sect.  
While it was Seeger’s case that gave its name to the multi-case decision, all three 
individuals were denied conscientious objector status because their religious beliefs did 
not necessarily include a connection to a Supreme Being.  Seeger, in his application for 
conscientious objector status, cited Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza for his ethical belief 
system.  He stated that he was,  "without belief in God, except in the remotest sense" 
(United States v. Seeger, 1965).   The Court of Appeals reversed his initial conviction on 
the grounds that, the Supreme being requirement of the section “distinguished between 
internally derived and externally compelled beliefs and was therefore an impermissible 
classification under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment” (United States v. 
Seeger, 1965). 
 Justice Thomas Clark, writing the opinion for the Court said, “we believe this 
construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern religious 
community” (United States v. Seeger, 1965).   Furthermore, the unanimous Court created 
precedent that all individuals with a general theistic belief system, who qualified under 
other conscientious objector status tests, be granted exemption from military service.  
Thus, believers of all variances of monotheism are afforded the same rights as believing 
members of the three Abrahamic faith traditions.  
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Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) 
 Elliott Ashton Welsh II, after begin classified I-A and available for military 
service, filed an application for conscientious objector status.  On the application, Welsh 
stated that he did not believe in a Supreme Being and that his pacifism had nothing to do 
with a religious belief system.  After the appeal board denied his application, Welsh 
refused to appear for induction.  Subsequently he was convicted of violating 50 U.S.C. 
App. S 462(a) and on 1 June 1966 was sentenced to prison for three years.  
 In Welsh v. United States (1970), the Court held that an individual who deeply 
and sincerely believes that all war is wrong, but only holds these beliefs based on ethics 
and morality that are not theistically based, is entitled to conscientious objector status.  
Furthermore, the Court stated that if Welsh was tested using the new test of status written 
in U.S. v Seeger he would have been granted conscientious objector status:  
“The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of 
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory 
definition.”  (Welsh v. United States, 1970) 
 
Clay vs. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971) 
Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, hereinafter referred to as Clay/Ali, 
applied for conscientious objector status during the Vietnam War.  His application was 
initially turned down by his local draft board and he subsequently appealed the decision.  
He was tentatively granted I-A status, which meant he was eligible for unrestricted 
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military service.  His file was referred to the Department of Justice and the F.B.I. began 
an inquiry into his request.  After the F.B.I. completed a thorough investigation, a hearing 
officer concluded that Clay/Ali’s claim for conscientious objector status should be 
accepted.  However, the Department of Justice advised the Appeal Board to disregard the 
hearing officer’s recommendation and deny his application.  After this denial, Clay/ Ali 
again refused to follow the traditional induction proceedings and he was subsequently 
prosecuted and convicted for this refusal.   
 In Clay vs. United States (1971), the Court reversed a lower court decision that 
Clay/Ali was rightly convicted of willfully refusing to submit to induction in the armed 
forces.  The Supreme Court held that Clay/Ali’s denial of conscientious objector claim 
was invalid and erroneous.  The Clay/Ali Court cited the decision in U.S. vs. Seeger, that 
Clay/Ali’s claim was, “unquestionably within the ‘religious training and belief’ clause of 
the exemption provision”  (Clay v. United States, 1971).   The Court went on to state that 
Clay/Ali’s “beliefs are founded on tenets of the Muslim religion as he understands them.  
They are surely no less religiously based that those of the three registrants before this 
Court in Seeger” (Clay v. United States, 1971).  The Court stated that the long established 
rule of law regarding conscientious objector status had settled precedent and thus clearly 
required them to reverse the lower court judgment.      
 
2.4. Relevant Case Law Regarding Taxes and Religious Freedom 
Complaints about the following decisions relating to public fiscal responsibilities 
state that in order to avoid the appearance of favoring a particular religious faith, the 
Court determines the validity of conscientious objection to taxes in regards to the 
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common good.  The Court determines that in the absence of a statutory exemption, the 
normative definition of religion stands and does not serve to protect against the 
compelling interest of the state.  The following decisions illustrate that the Court 
acknowledges that one’s religious affiliation, defined in numerous ways, cannot serve to 
mediate between one’s civic obligation to pay taxes and one’s freedom of conscience.  
 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)  
In United States v. Lee, (1982), Lee was a farmer and carpenter, and a member of 
the Old Order Amish, who believe that there is a religiously-based obligation to provide 
for fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the Social Security system. 
During certain years, when he employed other Amish to work on his farm and in his 
carpentry shop, Lee failed to withhold social security taxes from his employees or to pay 
the employer's share of such taxes because he believed that payment of the taxes and 
receipt of social security benefits would violate his Amish faith. After the Internal 
Revenue Service assessed him for the unpaid taxes, Lee paid a certain amount and then 
sued in Federal District Court for a refund, claiming that imposition of the taxes violated 
his First Amendment free exercise of religious rights and those of his employees.  
 In Lee the Court held that the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax 
system is of such importance that religious beliefs in conflict with the payment of taxes 
provide no basis for refusing to pay.  The ruling holds that, “the tax system could not 
function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments 
were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief” (United States v. Lee, 1982).   
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The Court’s rejection of a First Amendment challenge to social security laws is 
consistently applied to income tax challenges.   
 
United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627, 629-31 (7th Cir. 2000), 
 cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001) 
  Indianapolis Baptist Temple (I.B.T.) was founded in 1950 initially as a not-for-
profit corporation.  In 1983, I.B.T. became an unincorporated religious society.  In 1986, 
I.B.T. became a New Testament Church following the exclusive sovereignty of Jesus 
Christ, and claimed that all members were required to disassociate from secular 
government authority.  Acting upon their interpretations of the teachings of Jesus Christ, 
I.B.T. stopped filing federal employment tax returns and paying federal employment 
taxes.  Subsequently, the I.R.S. contacted I.B.T. for failure to file and pay.  This began a 
multi-year conversation regarding I.B.T.’s refusal to pay and the I.R.S. assessing taxes, 
interest and penalties totaling $3,498,355.62 along with a demand-to-pay letter.   
 In United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple (2001), the Court rejected the 
defendant’s Free Exercise12 challenge to the federal employment tax, asserting that those 
laws were not restricted to the defendant or other religion-related employers generally, 
and there was no indication that they were enacted for the purpose of burdening religious 
practices.  Furthermore, citing United States v. Lee (1982), regarding maintaining a sound 
and efficient tax system as a compelling government interest, the Court states that, “we 
find this authority persuasive and see no reason to reach a different conclusion”  (U.S. v 
I.B.T, 2001).  The Court disagreed with I.B.T.’s claim that claim that as a New Testament 
                                                        
12
 The Free Exercise Clause refers to the 1
st
 Amendment, which states that, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (United States 
Constitution, Amendment I). 
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Church, one not officially state-recognized, the case precedents could be disputed on 
factual grounds because they are based on recognized churches and thus are not 
applicable.  The Court held that, “none of these cases, expressly, or implicitly, rely on the 
fact that the entities involved were state- recognized, nor does such a distinction have any 
logical connection to the relevant legal standards”  (U.S. v I.B.T, 2001)  
 
United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 1993)  
George William Ramsey entered an I.R.S. taxpayer assistance office on 15 April 
1992 and began a Tax Day nonviolent direct action protest against the Government’s use 
of tax money for military expenditures.   Ramsey, displaying a protest sign, attempted to 
distribute propaganda paraphernalia and explain his beliefs to taxpayer assistance 
employees and individuals seeking assistance at the office.  Ramsey was asked to cease 
his protest and leave the office.  When he refused, officers arrested him.  Ramsey was 
charged and convicted of failure to comply with the lawful direction of a Federal 
Protective Officer, conduct which created a nuisance, and distributing handbills without a 
permit.  He was also ordered, as a requirement of probation, to pay his federal income 
taxes.   
 In United States v. Ramsey (1993), the Court mentioned that Ramsey stated in 
district court that he had not paid his income taxes for the past twenty years and that he 
did not intend to ever pay his income taxes. The Court rejected Ramsey’s argument that 
filing federal income tax returns and paying federal income taxes violates his pacifist 
religious beliefs.  The Court, citing Lee, said that Ramsey, “has no First Amendment right 
to avoid federal income taxes on religious grounds” (United States v. Ramsey, 1993). 
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Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173, 175-82 (3d Cir. 1999)  
From 1985 to 1989, Priscilla Adams, a devout Quaker, declared herself exempt 
from taxation on her W-4 forms.  These declarations resulted in no federal income tax 
being withheld from her pay for those years.  In 1989, the I.R.S. sent a letter to her 
employer demanding that they withhold taxes from her salary as if she had filed her W-4 
as married with one withholding allowance.  Adams’ employer, The Philadelphia Yearly 
Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, supported her in her nonviolent direct action 
of resistance, and determined that her resistance was a result of a “leading” from God.  
Adams’ did not contest the right of the Government to tax and she stated that she would 
pay her income taxes if the money was directed to non-military spending.   
 In Adams v. Commissioner (1999), the Court affirmed adjudged tax deficiencies 
and penalties for failure to file tax returns and pay tax, holding that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act did not require that the I.R.S. accommodate Adam’s religious 
beliefs that payment of taxes to fund the military is against the will of God, and that her 
beliefs would not constitute reasonable cause for purposes of the penalties.  Referencing 
Lee’s support of a federal tax system free from numerous exceptions, the Court held that,  
The nature of compelling interest involved - as characterized by the Supreme 
Court in Lee - converts the least restrictive means inquiry into a rhetorical 
question that has been answered by the analysis in Lee.  The least restrictive 
means of furthering a compelling interest in the collection of taxes . . . is in fact, 
to implement that system in a uniform, mandatory way, with Congress 
determining in the first instance if exemptions are built into the legislative 
scheme. (Adams v. Commissioner, 1999) 
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Jenkins v. Commissioner, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) 
Daniel Jenkins, a religious conscientious tax objector, stated that the collection of 
tax revenues for war offended his religious beliefs and thus violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.  He further stated that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act required that he 
and other like-minded tax payers be afforded the right to avoid payment and finally that 
the Ninth Amendment 
13
 provided him the right to refuse payment of income taxes if they 
were meant for military spending.    
In Jenkins v. Commissioner (2007), the petition for Certiorari
14
 was denied thus 
upholding the imposition of a $5,000 frivolous return penalty against Jenkins.  The Court 
held that the collection of tax revenues for expenditures that offended the religious beliefs 
of individual taxpayers did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, or the Ninth Amendment.  Again, like 
previous courts, the Court made no claim against the sincerity of his religious beliefs.  
However, the Court, citing previous decisions like Lee, stated that his sincere religious 
beliefs, “afford no basis for resisting payment of his taxes where, as here, the broad 
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is not meaningfully disputed”  (Jenkins 
v. Commissioner, 2007). 
 
 
 
                                                        
13
 Amendment IX of the United States Constitution states that, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people” (United States 
Constitution, Amendment IX). 
 
14
 Certiorari is a writ “issued by the United States Supreme Court when it determines that it will exercise its 
discretionary authority to review a decision by a federal appellate court or state court on a question of 
federal law” (Johns & Perschbacher, 2007, p. 254). 
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Wall v. U.S., 756 F.2d 52 (1985) 
In 1982, David Wall filed a tax return with a $6,060.00 war tax deduction.  He 
attached a statement explaining his rationale for the deduction.  He claimed that his 
religious convictions could not allow to him to, “contribute to the war machine of this 
county” (Wall v. U. S., 1985) and that he redirected the withheld money to charities.  
Subsequently, the I.R.S. assessed Wall a $500 penalty.  Wall paid fifteen percent of the 
penalty and filed a refund claim.  After the I.R.S. denied his refund claim, Wall filed suit 
for a full refund.  A district court granted summary judgment to the I.R.S. and Wall 
appealed the decision.  
In Wall vs. U.S., (1985), the Court upheld the imposition of a $500 frivolous 
return penalty against Wall for taking a war deduction on his federal income tax return 
based on his religious convictions.  The Court cited United States vs. Lee in stating that, 
“the necessities of revenue collection through a sound tax system raise governmental 
interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the free exercise rights of those who find the 
tax objectionable on bona fide religious grounds” (Wall vs. U.S., 1985).  Furthermore the 
Court, citing Welch vs. United States, stated that individuals who are assessed the $500 
fine are not penalized, “for expressing their moral or religious beliefs, but are penalized 
because they file returns containing substantially incorrect self- assessment based on a 
clearly unallowable credit” (Wall vs. U.S., 1985).   
 
United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658 (1980) 
Steven Peister formed the Life Science Church of Friendly Hills in 1976.  While 
forming the church, Peister took a vow of poverty.  Furthermore, he donated all of his 
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possessions to the church because members of the Order of Almighty God, with which 
the Life Science Church of Friendly Hills was associated, were required to disavow all of 
their possessions, however they were still required to hold assigned outside jobs to fund 
the church.  While working at the assigned job, Peister attempted to stop tax withholding 
from his wages.  After further conversations with his employer and the I.R.S., Peister 
submitted a W-4 claiming 99 exemptions.  Subsequently, a jury found Peister guilty of 
violating I.R.C. s 7205, 26 U.S.C. s 7205, willfully supplying false or fraudulent 
information on an exemption certificate form.  Peister appealed his conviction.   
In U.S. v. Peister (1980), the court rejected Peister’s argument that he was exempt 
from income tax based on his vow of poverty after he became the minister of a church he 
formed and found his First Amendment right to freedom of religion was not violated.  
The Court held that Peister’s rights were not violated because he lacked sincerity of belief 
regarding the church.  Further, it was reported that Peister set up the church for the sole 
purpose of avoiding tax to make that decision.  Citing United States vs. Seeger, the Court 
argued that, without a sincere belief, there could be no reliance on good faith.  
 
2.5. Relevant Statutory Authority 
 After reviewing numerous relevant case laws, I am not surprised that 
conscientious tax objectors have never succeeded in arguing a First Amendment claim 
against paying taxes.  The constitutional claims are not successful, yet, in comparison, 
legislative claims by conscientious objectors (COs) are.  Similar to conscientious tax 
objection, relief from conscription is not mandated by the Constitution; it was established 
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by legislative action.  Next, I will unpack the legislative history of Conscientious 
Objection and the more recent Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.   
 
2.5.1. Conscientious Objection 
 As the preceding relevant case law suggests, the Free Exercise Clause of the 
Constitution does not require religious accommodation.  However, while it is not 
required, Congress is free to create laws of accommodation.  It is important to unpack the 
history of conscientious objection in the colonies and later in the United States in order to 
understand the development of Congressional accommodations of conscientious 
objectors.   
 As I have stated before, the roots of nonviolent direct action and pacifism predate 
the Revolutionary War.  Many early colonists immigrated to the “New World” in order to 
escape religious persecution.  Pacifism was one belief for which many were persecuted.  
Early colonies, such as Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, established the legal right to 
religious freedom.   However, while the right to the free exercise of religion was 
established in the Constitution, many pacifists continued to experience persecution for 
their religious beliefs. (Franz, Bassett, Ratzlaff, & Godshall, 2009) 
 Prior to the founding of the United States, the earliest recorded case of religious 
persecution, on a member of the Religious Society of Friends, happened in 1658 in 
Maryland.  Richard Keene refused to be trained as a soldier and was subsequently fined 
and beaten by the local sheriff (Brock, 1968).  However, Brown (1986) reminds us that in 
the late 17
th
 century, Rhode Island exempted conscientious objectors from serving in 
militias created to protect against attacks from Dutch and Native Americans.  The 
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Continental Congress, in 1775, enacted the first national conscientious objection law by 
stating that:  
As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms in any 
case, this congress intends no violence to their consciences, but earnestly 
recommend it to them to contribute liberally in this time of universal calamity, to 
the relief of their distressed brethren in the several colonies, and do all other 
services to their oppressed country, which they can consistently with their 
religious principles. (American Archives, n.d.) 
 
However, while numerous proposals were offered during the debates on the Bill of Rights 
to exempt religious conscientious objectors from the militia, none were passed.   
 Moving past the early years of the United States towards the Civil War, the role of 
conscientious objector takes a peculiar twist.  As many religious conscientious objectors 
were also morally opposed to slavery, their solidarity with the North’s cause precipitated 
many to financially support the North’s war effort, as Brock states, even through the 
payment of special war taxes (Brock, 1968).  Furthermore, he goes on to state that some 
pacifists even served in the northern military.  However, some pacifists continued their 
objection to all wars and Congress enacted the Federal Militia act on 17 July 1862, which 
basically left primary responsibility for conscription to the states rather than the federal 
government.  However, Congress made a provision for the President to order 
conscription, which President Lincoln did that same year.  In 1864, the Conscription Act 
of 3 March 1863 was amended to provide for religious conscientious objectors with an 
alternative to military service, such as serving in hospitals or paying a fee of $300, which 
would specifically benefit wounded and sick soldiers (United States Enrollment Act, 
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1863).   As Brock suggests, for some objectors, these alternatives were not sufficient as 
they believed that these acts would only further the war cause, rather than deter war.  
 By using the wording in the Selective Draft Act of 1917, more than 64,000 draft-
age men claimed conscientious objector status during World War I (NWTRCC 
Conference, personal communication, 2008).  The Act stated that, “a member of any 
well-recognized religious sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles 
forbid its members to participate in war in any form,” (United States Selective Service 
Act, 1917) were not compelled to military service.  However, these men were not 
completely released from service because the Act further stated that, “no person so 
exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall declare 
to be noncombatant”  (United States Selective Service Act, 1917).  While the law 
provided relief from combat service, it did not provide relief from harsh treatment and 
fierce opposition.  Many conscientious objectors found themselves under great pressure 
to serve in some type of service within the military, even after receiving conscientious 
objector status.  (M. Morton, personal communication, March 7, 2012).  Their 
conscientious objector status freed them from performing combat service; but not from 
the control of the military.  Many officers hated conscientious objectors and one went so 
far as to claim that they were, “enemies of the Republic. . . fakers, and active agents of 
the enemy” (Moskos & Chambers, 1993, p. 33).   
 Perhaps due to the poor treatment afforded conscientious objectors during World 
War I (WW I), conscientious objectors during World War II (WW II) were afforded 
much more pleasant treatment.  The new governmental policy during WW II extended 
the opportunity of conscientious objector status to all religious objectors.  This statute 
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exempted from combatant service a draftee, “who, by reason of religious training and 
belief is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form” (Selective Service 
Act of 1940).  Previously, this exemption had only been extended to members of the 
historic peace churches.  Furthermore, the new statute provided the opportunity for 
conscientious objectors to serve in civilian alternative service rather than the 
noncombatant military service required during WW I. Of the more than 5,000 
conscientious objectors imprisoned during WW II, most were denied status because they 
failed to meet the statutory definition of a religious conscientious objector (Franz, 
Bassett, Ratzlaff, & Godshall, 2009).  For example, members of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
refused to apply for conscientious objector status because they wanted complete 
exemption from service so that they would be free to continue to preach and witness.  
(Conscientious tax objector #1, personal communication, January 4, 2012). 
 According to John Whiteclay Chambers II, who calculated the ratio of men 
classified as conscientious objectors per 100 actual inductees in the military for each of 
the wars in which America participated during the twentieth century, the ratio in WW I 
was 0.14 per 100 actual inductees, in WW II it was 0.15 per 100 actual inductees and 
during the Vietnam War the ratio greatly increased.  In 1967 the ratio was 8.1 per 100 
actual inductees, in 1971 the ratio was 42.62 per 100 actual inductees and in 1972 the 
amazing ratio was 130.72 per 100 actual inductee (Moskos & Chambers, 1993, p. 42).  
One probable explanation for the dramatic increase between 1967 and 1971/72 is the two 
important Supreme Court decisions (Welsh v. United States and United States v. Seeger) 
that drastically expanded the definition of conscientious objector to allow for secular 
conscientious objectors as long as their beliefs were morally and ethically based.   
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 In 1967, Congress enacted the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.  This act 
ensured that conscientious objectors would not be compelled to violate their beliefs by 
participating in war.  The act states that the exemption is provided to any person who, by 
reason of their religious beliefs and trainings, “is conscientiously opposed to participation 
in war in any form
15” (United States Military Selective Service Act, 1967).  
 
2.5.2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
 
 As the preceding relevant case law suggests, the Free Exercise Clause of the 
Constitution does not require religious accommodation.  However, while it is not 
required, Congress is free to provide an accommodation as long as it does not violate the 
Establishment Clause
16
.  Many such accommodations exist within Federal Tax Law.  For 
example, a local property tax exemption for religious institutions was upheld as a 
reasonable and permissible accommodation of religion in Walz v. Tax Commissioner of 
New York, (1970).  Furthermore, numerous accommodations of religion exist in the 
Federal tax code.
17
 Moreover, 26 U.S.C. §3127, enacted by Congress in 1988, provides 
for the accommodation requested in Lee.  Congress enacted an exemption for cases in 
which both employer and their employee(s) are members of religious faiths that are 
opposed to participation in programs supported by the Social Security Act.   
 In Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon vs. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court greatly reduced the scope of protections and 
                                                        
15
 I added the italics because of the exciting development of statutory language that provides for war in any 
form. In Chapter IV I will return to these new possibilities. 
 
16
 The Establishment Clause refers to the 1
st
 Amendment, which states that, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (United States 
Constitution, Amendment I). 
 
17
 See 26 U.S.C. § 107, §§ 1402 (e), and 1402 (g). 
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accommodations afforded religious dissenters under the Free Exercise clause.  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that allowing exceptions to every state law or 
regulation affecting religion “would open the prospect of constitutionally required 
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind" (Oregon v. Smith, 
1990).   Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, 
vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.  Historians and legal scholars suggest 
that the Court’s decision indirectly overruled Wisconsin vs. Yoder.  However, even as the 
compelling interest test was deleted, the Court maintained that the government cannot, 
“impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views” (Oregon v. Smith, 1990).  
 Following the ruling in Smith, many religious persons of all denominations united 
in protest and Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 
restoring the compelling interest test of Yoder.  The words of RFRA itself clearly indicate 
Congress’ intent to reverse Smith, “government shall not substantially burden a person's 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” While 
an exception is provided for a “compelling government interest,” it is only allowed by the 
“least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest”  (Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 1993).   
 Looking at congressional records of debates on the floor, it is clear that neither the 
House nor the Senate intended to affect the issue of abortion or overrule cases like Lee 
and Hernandez.  Moreover, the Act does not address the challenges faced by religious 
conscientious tax objectors.   
 However, in 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997), the 
Supreme Court held that RFRA, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, exceeded congressional powers as the law applied to state laws. 
Furthermore, the Court held that RFRA violated the balance of power between the federal 
and state governments.   
Subsequent courts,
18
 ruling on the application of RFRA to federal law, cite Lee 
and rely on its ruling that federal law does not require that income tax laws accommodate 
religious beliefs, specifically, conscientious objection to war. These decisions have 
returned the compelling interest test of Yoder and have determined that the government’s 
compelling interest in a broad tax system is of greater importance than the individual’s 
conscience.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18
 See Adams v. Commissioner 170 F. 3d 173 (3d Circ. 1999) and Browne v. United States, 22F. Supp 2d 
309, 310 (D. Vt. 1998) aff’d, 176 F. 3d 25 (2d Circ. 1999) 
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CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
 Chapter II examined ways the United States of America treats religion in the 
public domain.  Specifically: the court’s tendency to treat religion as a private concern, 
relevant case law, and relevant statutory authority.  This chapter looks at the intersection 
of those three by transitioning from the legal explanations against governmental 
provisions for conscientious tax objection to: tangible examples and methods of 
conscientious tax objection, examples of possible repercussions of conscientious tax 
objection, and current ongoing court cases of conscientious tax objectors.  
 
3.1. Methods of Conscientious Tax Objection  
 
 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is often quoted as saying that he liked to pay taxes 
because he felt he was buying civilization (Internal Revenue Service, n.d.).  
Conscientious tax objectors may wonder how he would react to the civilization that is 
being purchased by today’s federal taxes.  In the era of the modern military industrial 
complex, conscientious tax objectors use many methods to resist payment of federal 
taxes.  During research for this thesis, I discovered the pluralistic nature of the forms of 
tax resistance, even as some conscientious tax objectors’ reasons may align.  The 
conscientious tax objectors, whom I interviewed or read about, all practice unique forms 
of resistance.  I have sorted their methods into the following seven categories: file and 
refuse to pay, do not file and do not pay, 1040 form resistance, W-4 resistance, file and 
make payable not to the I.R.S., phone tax resistance, and the owe nothing plan.  This list 
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is by no means exhaustive, but it can serve as a representative synopsis of the most 
common methods of conscientious tax objection.   
 
3.1.1. File and Refuse to Pay 
 This method of resistance is the most straightforward and simplest form of 
conscientious tax objection.  The conscientious tax objector completes her/his annual 
federal tax filing as if s/he were not planning to engage in a nonviolent direct action.  
Once the form is complete, s/he prepares a letter addressed to the I.R.S. stating her/his 
rationale for the refusal to pay federal income taxes.  In the letter, which may also be 
mailed to all of her/his elected officials or submitted as a letter to the editor of local/ 
regional/ national newspapers, and is often mailed to family and friends, the 
conscientious tax objector often cites federal laws and/or relevant case law which s/he 
believes support her/ his moral conviction to not engage in war in any form. 
 In order to withhold the greatest dollar amount from the federal government, the 
conscientious tax objector must also engage in other forms of nonviolent direct action 
resistance.    Prior to filling out the 1040 form, the conscientious tax objector must make 
certain changes to her/his W4s to exempt her/himself from federal tax withholding, or 
transition from a W4 job to self-employment. In the absence of these initial decisions, the 
amount withheld will not be the total tax liability for any given year.     
 
3.1.2. Do Not File 
 
 While the file and refuse-to-pay method involves a certain public component of 
nonviolent direct action, the Do Not File can be and often is a private form of resistance.   
This method often, but not necessarily, involves, preparing the federal tax forms as is the 
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case with the file and refuse to pay method.  However, this method does not involve 
filing the form with the I.R.S.  The same initial decisions regarding withholding and 
employment are applicable to this method of resistance.  The non-filing conscientious 
objector also chooses whether to publicize her/ his method of resistance.  Failing to file a 
federal tax form is against Federal Tax Code 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (a) (1) and (2) which 
states that, “if a taxpayer fails to file, a penalty will be added unless the taxpayer can 
demonstrate (1) lack of willful neglect, and (2) reasonable cause.”  According to the 
Court in Adams v. C.I.R (1999), “Willful neglect can be read as ‘meaning a conscious, 
intentional failure or reckless indifference. . . [and] whether the elements that constitute 
‘reasonable cause’ are present in ‘a given case is a question of fact, but what elements 
must be present to constitute ‘reasonable cause’ is a question of law” (Adams v. C.I.R., 
1999).  
 
3.1.3. 1040 Form Resistance 
   
 Similar to the File and Refuse to Pay method, 1040 Form Resistance involves the 
tax payer preparing her/ his 1040 tax form and refusing to pay her/his full tax obligation.  
The conscientious objector chooses a symbolic figure to withhold.  Such resisted figures 
can be, $10.40, $50.00, or perhaps 48%, (the percentage of all Federal income tax dollars 
the Federal Government allocates to past and present Military spending) of the 
conscientious objectors annual tax obligation.   Many conscientious objectors who utilize 
this method of resistance also choose to participate in the public demonstration of their 
nonviolent direction action by engaging in the same letter writing campaign as the File 
and Refuse to Pay method.  Numerous campaigns have developed around the 1040 
resistance method, such as the National War Tax Coordinating Committee’s War Tax 
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Boycott, Shane Claiborne’s 1040 for Peace Campaign, and Schools Not Bombs 
Resistance Campaign. 
19
 
 
3.1.4. W-4 Resistance 
 A method of resistance that involves an additional violation of the law is W-4 
Resistance.  Using this method, a conscientious objector purposefully adds exemptions to 
her/his W-4 form that s/he is not legally allowed.  For example, a conscientious objector 
may fill out the form and mark 10 on the number of exemptions line when s/he may be 
single with no children.  In that situation, the objector is legally allowed 1 exemption. 
The rationale behind the additional exemptions in W-4 Resistance varies by individual.  
Some conscientious tax objectors state a personal ethical belief in financial and moral 
responsibility towards individual civilians of countries in which the United States has 
recently engaged in military actions.  Other conscientious tax objectors state a personal 
and ethical belief that s/he is financially responsible for individual citizens of the United 
States who are marginalized and denied access to federal funds due the financial decision 
of Congress to prioritize the military industrial complex over domestic humanitarian 
concerns.  Other conscientious objectors may simply increase their exemptions for the 
sole purpose of reducing their withholding to zero in order to completely participate in 
the File and Refuse to Pay method stated above.  Whatever the personal reason for 
engaging in the W-4 resistance method, the individual conscientious tax objector engages 
in an illegal action once s/he claims non permissible or non-existent dependents on 
her/his filed 1040 form.   
 
 
                                                        
19
 See Chapter IV for examples of contemporary 1040 campaigns.  
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3.1.5. File and Address Check to a Different Department 
 
 Another symbolic method of nonviolent direct action regarding taxes is to file the 
1040 form correctly but send payment for the required tax obligation made payable to a 
particular department within the Federal, State, and/or local government that the 
individual conscientious tax objector believes to be less or not associated with the 
military industrial complex.  For example, the conscientious tax objector may make the 
check payable to her/his city public works department rather than the I.R.S.  The check is 
then mailed to the I.R.S.   Although it is not made payable to the I.R.S, past actions have 
resulted in the I.R.S. endorsing and depositing the check into the general fund.  However, 
other actions have resulted in the I.R.S. directing the check to the correct addressee, yet 
not applying the payment to the individual conscientious objector’s account20  
(Conscientious tax objector # 24, personal communication, April 7, 2012).    If the I.R.S. 
fails to credit the individual’s account for the payment sent, the individual conscientious 
tax objector may still acquire fines, interests, and penalties.  
 
3.1.6. Phone Tax Resistance 
 
 A low risk entry into tax resistance is refusing the federal excise tax on telephone 
service.  This tax has a long association with funding wartime activity.   The history of 
the modern phone tax is convoluted and filled with repeals and reinstatements.  A tax on 
toll calls was imposed in 1898 during the Spanish-American War.  This tax was meant to 
help fund the wartime effort.  This first tax was repealed in 1902.  In 1914, the War Tax 
Revenue Act enacted tax on long distance calls. This was repealed in 1916, but reinstated 
in 1917 along with other war taxes.   Then, in 1924, it was repealed and reinstated in 
                                                        
20
 For specific examples of such events please see Chapter IV. 
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1932. The first tax on local telephone service, a 25% tax on long distance calls and a 15% 
tax on local service, was instituted during World War II.  Congress retained this tax until 
the Korean War.  However, in 1954, the tax was reduced to 10% on all telephone 
services.  In 1965, Congress approved a reduction of the phone tax to 3% and planned to 
phase it out entirely in 1969.  However, in 1966, the Johnson Administration needed 
money for the escalating war in Vietnam.   Congress passed a special tax bill that 
included a reinstatement of the 10% phone tax.  In 1968, Congress extended the tax for 
two more years.   In late 1970, another two-year extension was approved with the proviso 
that it be reduced by 1% each year thereafter and repealed entirely on 1 January1982.   
However, in January 1981, Congress extended the tax by another year at 2%. The tax was 
due to expire on 1 January1983, but instead increased from 1% to 3%.  The 3% telephone 
tax was scheduled to expire at the end of 1987, however, Congress voted to extend the 
tax until 1990.   In 1990, instead of letting the tax expire, the 101st Congress extended it 
permanently at 3%.   However, sponsors of the Act for Better Child Care
21
 used the 
phone tax extension as a source of new funding for their programs as a requirement under 
the Gramm-Rudman rules to reduce the federal deficit.  The permanent phone tax was 
then attached to this bill and passed by Congress.   Nevertheless, the phone tax revenues 
go into the general fund as they always have and are not specifically earmarked for child-
care programs. (Hang Up On War, 2012)  
From April 1966 through 2001, the total revenues from the federal excise tax on 
telephone service amounted to $89 billion according to the I.R.S.   In 2001, the telephone 
tax raised almost $6 billion.  The federal excise tax on long distance telephone service 
                                                        
21
 In October 1990, Congress passed legislation authorizing two new major federal programs to subsidize 
child-care for low and moderate-income families and to improve the quality of care. The provisions were 
included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. 
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was abolished on 31 July 2006, after the government lost five appellate decisions on 
cases brought by big corporations. Because the government and the I.R.S. had continued 
to collect the tax after a number of these cases were lost, they were forced to offer 
refunds for the three previous years on 2006 tax forms.   Currently, the federal excise tax 
no longer applies to any long distance, mixed use phone service (like cell phones), flat 
rate phone service, or internet phone service.   It is still applied on local-only telephone 
service.  (Hang Up On War, 2012) 
 The Hang Up on War Campaign began with a suggestion in or around 1966 by 
Doris Sargent to her family and friends. (Conscientious tax objector #1, personal 
communication, March 3, 2012) The well-known Catholic Worker activist, Karl Meyer, 
began talking about the idea in the Chicago area and soon the idea spread to New York 
and the National War Resisters League.  The League printed cards with the slogan “Hang 
up on War” and encouraged conscientious tax objectors to include the cards with their 
bill payment each month.   To see a copy of one such card, see Appendix C.   By 1972, 
telephone tax resistance had grown to nearly a half million conscientious objectors.  
While the campaign began when the excise tax was more widely applied, the campaign 
continues to remain active with many participants.    (Hang Up On War, 2012) 
 
3.1.7. The Owe Nothing Plan  
 
 “In conforming to my simple lifestyle, I do not own a car.  I also do not like to 
use more fossil fuel than I already do.  I also don't think the I.R.S. will confiscate my 
bike.  I also think riding a bike is healthier than driving in a car, ” writes peace activist 
Cindy Sheehan on her personal blog (Sheehan, 2012).   Sheehan, like many other 
conscientious objectors, chooses to live below the taxable line as a method of nonviolent 
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direct action against the military industrial complex.    According to the 2012 I.R.S. 
Standard Deductions and Exemptions, the Standard deduction is $5,950. 00 and the 
standard personal exemption is $3,800.  Thus, for a single person with no dependents, the 
total taxable income that s/he can earn without owning a federal tax obligation is $9,750.  
Certain other allowable deductions could increase the amount of income an individual 
may earn without incurring a tax obligation. Basically, a religious conscientious tax 
objector can reduce his/her income to the poverty line in order to avoid a tax obligation.  
This is the only legally allowable form of nonviolent direction action of tax resistance 
afforded religious conscientious objectors.  For example, a married conscientious 
objector filing jointly with two children can have a total income of $27,1000.00 ($15,200 
($3,800 x 4) + $11,900.) without a federal tax obligation.  See table 1 for the standard 
deduction and personal exemptions. 
 
Table 1: Standard deduction and personal exemptions 
 Standard Deduction Personal Exemption 
Single $5,950.00 $3,800.00 
Married, filing jointly $11,9000.00 $3,800.00 
 
As a result of my research, I believe that earning less than the taxable income 
level will remain the only legal form of conscientious tax resistance.  My research 
suggests that if the current trend continues the Supreme Court may never exempt 
religious conscientious objectors from their tax obligation as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation.  My reasoning is based on the ruling in Hamilton v. Regents of the 
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University of California (1934).    This case involves a group of students enrolled in the 
University of California at Berkeley.   The students refused to participate in the school’s 
Reserve Officer Training Corps program, a Regent’s requirement for all male 
undergraduate students of a certain academic class standing.  The students refused based 
on their membership in a church, which had previously renounced military action as 
contrary to God’s will.  The students sought school exemption and were denied.  After 
their exemption was denied, the students again refused to participate and they were 
suspended from school.  As a result of the suspension, the students’ parents sued the 
University Regents to reinstate the students. The Court ruled that the students chose to 
attend the University of California at Berkeley. They were not compelled to attend the 
University.  The students made an informed decision to attend the University and by 
making that decision were obligated to follow the existing rules and regulations of The 
Regents, including but not limited to the required participation in war practice.  
The same rationale can be used with regards to conscientious tax objection.  The 
only current way to legally withhold taxes associated with war is to live below the 
taxable line. Wages are a choice. Those citizens who choose to earn a wage that puts 
them above the line of taxation are making the choice. The federal government can argue 
that by choosing to earn a wage above the taxable line, the religious conscientious tax 
objector is choosing to participate in the existing Internal Revenue Code.  Moreover, the 
right to refuse compelled participation in war through payment of taxes is not a matter of 
religious freedom.   That claim is moot.   In fact, the only topic of discussion regarding 
the conscientious tax objector is whether s/he will choose to earn a taxable wage.   An 
individual’s religious freedom is not unlawfully imposed upon because the individual is 
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free to decide to earn a taxable wage.   Following this line of reasoning, the only 
constitutionally permitted avenue available to an individual not wanting to act against 
her/his conscience by paying for war is to live below the taxable income line, unless 
Congress provides for an exemption through a statute like the Religious Freedom Peace 
Tax Fund Act.  
 
3.1.8. Redirection 
 Most conscientious tax objectors, whom I interviewed, not only withhold their 
federal tax money but also redirect that money to institutions and organizations that 
support life-affirming measures.  Moreover, the individual conscientious tax objectors 
often redirect their withheld taxes to organizations in their own communities that are in 
need of resources due in large measure to the priorities of the federal government.  Many 
conscientious tax objectors also send a portion of their withheld taxes to “alternative 
funds”.  These funds were specifically created as a way to collect small amounts of 
resisted funds so that the collected total can provide for a greater impact to the recipients 
of the redirected funds.  These funds also provide some security against seizure, as the 
conscientious tax objector’s principle deposit is never redirected, only the interest on the 
principal.  This level of security is mutually beneficial. The conscientious tax objector 
has some financial protection, as the principle remains available to pay I.R.S. penalties, if 
desired, and the local community organizations receive grants and often interest-free 
loans
22
.  Some funds have been created with the sole purpose of holding money in escrow 
pending the passage of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund. 
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 Further details for why these specific funds are important can be found in Chapter IV. 
 
  44 
3.2. Ramifications of Conscientious Tax Objection  
 
One should not engage in tax resistance without fully considering the 
ramifications of that decision.  Tax resistance is not an easy nonviolent direction action to 
sustain.  It is not without potential severe penalties.  Perhaps one of the most severe is 
that, to the majority of taxpayers, a conscientious tax objector appears foolish, 
impractical, or unpatriotic and is often labeled and judged as such by her/ his family, co-
workers, and even friends.
23
   Furthermore, legally, the conscientious tax objector breaks 
the law and faces criminal charges that may result in a fine of up to $10,000 (possibly 
even greater) and/or a prison term of up to a year. In practice, the Internal Revenue 
Service, through correspondence and levies, tries to collect refused taxes without 
engendering publicity through court actions (perhaps to avoid opportunities for the 
activists to educate the public on conscientious tax objection). These penalties 
notwithstanding, once the individual decides for her/ himself that payment for war is as 
reprehensible as fighting in war, the hazards involved in defying the government 
presumably weigh less than the hazards invited by defying one’s conscience.    
Nonviolent direction action for peace often entails exposure to unpredictable 
risks.  Conscientious tax objection is no exception.  In the following few pages, I describe 
the most common risks of engaging in this form of nonviolent direction action and give 
historical examples of the risks.  These data are included so that the risks taken and the 
repercussions experienced by conscientious tax objectors can be evaluated as one aspect 
of the resistance.  Later in Chapter IV, I discuss the repercussions suffered by individual 
conscientious tax objectors from their acts of resistance.   
 
                                                        
23
 See Chapter IV for examples. 
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3.2.1. Penalties and Fines 
 
The conscientious tax objector who engages in conscientious tax objection by 
filing her/his tax forms and refusing to pay, can expect to receive some type of tax due 
notice from the I.R.S.   These notices may include penalties of up to 25% of the unpaid 
tax obligation plus compound interest.   For the conscientious tax objector who chooses 
to not file, should the I.R.S. catch up with her/him, s/he should expect to be told to file 
for the non-filed years (however the I.R.S. may not request all non-filed years) 
(Conscientious tax objector #1, personal communication, December 4, 2011).  
Furthermore, the non-filer should expect to receive fines for failing to file.  If the I.R.S. 
suspects that a conscientious tax objector has falsely filled out her/his W-4 form, the 
employer of the conscientious tax objector may be forced, by the I.R.S., to adjust the 
payroll exemptions to the minimum allowance to allow for the maximum withholding 
available in an attempt to recoup previous lost tax obligations.  Conscientious tax 
objectors who file a return with an illegal deduction (i.e., war tax deduction), a political 
message written directly on the return, with no lines filled out, and even with a political 
message stapled to the form, can expect to receive a frivolous fine penalty as large as 
$5,000.00.  
The following is part of a frivolous fine warning letter that I viewed during one of 
my interviews.  The conscientious tax objector showed me this letter and permitted me to 
publish it on the condition that s/he would remain anonymous.  
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I.R.S. 
Ogden, Utah 
 
 “Dear Taxpayer24: 
  
 This letter serves to inform you of the potential consequences of the 
 position you have taken and to offer you an opportunity to correct your 
submission within 30 days from the date of this letter.  Internal Revenue Code 
Section 6702 imposes a $5,000 penalty for the filing of a frivolous tax return or 
purported tax return.  We are proposing a $5,000 penalty per return based on your 
filing of a frivolous tax return(s) or purported tax return(s).” 
(Conscientious tax objectors #5 &#6, personal communication, November 4 
2011) 
 
 One story of a frivolous filing penalty of $5,000.00 comes from acquaintances of 
mine in Eugene, Oregon. A married couple (names withheld) received individual penalty 
charges of $5,000.00 for a total fine of $10,000.00 as a consequence of their first act of 
conscientious tax objection.  They joined the 2008 war tax boycott and withheld a 
symbolic $50 and redirected the withheld taxes to the nonprofit Direct Aid Initiative, 
which works with Iraqi refugees in Jordan.  In a letter regarding their frivolous tax return 
penalty they wrote,  
We dutifully enclosed a letter of explanation as to our actions. At most we 
expected to receive a chastising letter from the I.R.S., a small penalty, and a 
demand to pay the tardy amount.   Imagine our surprise when four months later 
we received a letter from the I.R.S., threatening each of us with a $5,000 penalty 
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  Taxpayer used to fulfill anonymous request.  
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for filing a frivolous tax return. The letter went on to state that any further action 
on our part would cause an additional  $5,000 fine for each of us, without further 
notice or reason.   After shaking off the initial shock and consulting with fellow 
WTR colleagues, we learned that this I.R.S. tactic was new to all of them. We 
decided to pay the late amount and did so, within the time period specified. 
Thinking the matter had come to a logical conclusion, we felt able to shift our 
gears and to think of how next to act as war tax resisters.  Not so! Four months 
later, we received dual letters in the mail from the I.R.S., this time informing us 
that we each had been issued a penalty of $5,000, payable in 13 days. This from 
our beneficent government! Disbelief both at the gross inefficient workings (we 
had paid!) and malignance ($5,000 fine for a $50.00 withholding???!!!) of the 
I.R.S. prevailed in our hearts. We were stunned. Thought of retaining legal 
counsel began. On the good advice of fellow resisters, we contacted our local   
Congressman's office, explained the whole story, and they went into action with 
lightning speed. Through their auspices, we faxed copies of all of our I.R.S. 
correspondence and paperwork to the I.R.S. Legislative Advocates, both in our 
home state and in Washington, DC. In a matter of two weeks, we had a 
preliminary abatement, and in another three weeks we received formal letters 
from the I.R.S. CREDITING us with the amount of $10,000 on our case! There 
was no apology (had we really expected them to do so?) nor was there ANY 
explanation. Our relief was palpable.  Finally, we received another letter from the 
I.R.S., billing us a more rational $54.00, late fee for the money that was withheld.  
That we will pay! Hopefully with the payment of this fee our inaugural action 
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with NWTRCC will be culminated. Oh boy! What shall we do for resistance 
excitement next year?!  (More Than a Paycheck, 2009) 
 
3.2.2. Wage Garnishments and Bank Account Seizures/ Levies 
 
 Once the I.R.S. decides to send a conscientious tax objector a “final demand” 
notice, s/he can expect, if the demand payment is not met, to have her/ his bank accounts 
seized and/or her/ his wages garnished.   If the conscientious tax objector holds a W-4 
job, it is most likely that the I.R.S. will first act on a wage garnishment before a bank 
seizure.  In the State of Oregon, for example, the law states that the employer is obligated 
to garnish up to the maximum, which is generally 25% of the employee’s disposable 
earnings, as long as the employee is left with at least $218 per week after the garnishment 
(HB 2682 2011). The employer is held legally responsible for garnishing the employee’s 
wages until such time as the garnishment notice is rescinded.  If the conscientious tax 
objector does not hold a W-4 job (i.e., is self-employed), the I.R.S. has the right to seize 
assets through a levy.  For example, if the conscientious tax objector is owed payments in 
her/his accounts receivable, the I.R.S. may levy such payments and demand the payor 
pay directly to the I.R.S.  If the I.R.S. decides that the previous described methods are not 
effective, then it has the authority to seize bank accounts associated with the Social 
Security Number of the conscientious tax objector.  If the conscientious tax objector 
maintains a bank account, the I.R.S. may seize the entire deposit, up to the total amount 
of premium, interest, and penalties owed. (NWTRCC Conference, personal 
communication, 2008)  
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3.2.3. Property Seizures 
 
 Although more rare than penalties and fines, wage garnishment, bank account 
seizures and levies, the I.R.S. has seized property from conscientious tax objectors for 
unpaid taxes (see Appendix D).  The I.R.S. may take control of any property in order to 
auction it to recoup owed tax obligations.  The I.R.S. may also place a lien on a property. 
Past seized properties include: vehicles, houses, and even bicycles.  During the Vietnam 
War, many unpaid telephone taxes resulted in property seizure.  According to the 
National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee (N.W.R.T.C.C.), the seizures (and 
threats to seize) appear to be obvious attempts at intimidation and to force the 
conscientious tax objector into cooperation by revealing sources of other assets rather 
than attempts to actually collecting money. (NWTRCC Conference, personal 
communication, 2008)  
One notable property seizure is that of Betsy Corner and Randy Kehler.  Betsy 
Corner and Randy Kehler, married long-time conscientious tax objectors, engaged in a 
multi-year conversation with the I.R.S. regarding their refusal to pay their federal tax 
obligations.  Both Corner and Kehler were self- employed and, according to Kehler, “The 
I.R.S. had attached [their] bank account, garnisheed [their] wages, and placed a lien on 
[their] property—with little monetary success” (Kehler, 1994).    
Perhaps because of their employment status, the I.R.S. seized their home in 
Colrain, Massachusetts in 1989, to recover $27,000.00 in unpaid federal taxes, penalties, 
and interest.  After the I.R.S. seized their home, the couple and their young daughter 
refused to move out and began to occupy the home.    U.S. Marshals and I.R.S. Agents 
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arrested Corner and Kehler on 3 December 1991. 
25
  After the home was seized, 
community supporters and other conscientious tax objectors organized.  Affinity groups
26
 
from all over the world gathered to provide rotating one-week occupation stints.  On 12 
February 1992, the home was sold at auction to Danny Franklin and Terry Charnesky for 
$5,400.  Franklin and Charnesky, not supporters of Corner and Kehler, won the auction 
with the highest bid. The home, while still occupied, was auctioned to recoup the unpaid 
taxes.  However, the land was not auctioned because it belonged to the Valley 
Community Land Trust.   After the auction, the affinity groups refused to leave the home.  
On 15 April 1992, supporters of Franklin and Charnesky (in opposition to Corner and 
Kehler) moved in and began to occupy the home while the affinity group on rotation that 
week was protesting at another location.  With Franklin and Charnesky, recognized by 
the government as the legal owners of the home, now occupying the building, the Corner 
and Kehler affinity groups began occupying the land outside the home.  This switch 
began a more than twenty-month land occupation nonviolent direct action.  After 
numerous affinity group members’ arrests, an out-of-court settlement was reached 
between the Land Trust and Franklin and Charnesky.  Franklin and Charnesky deeded the 
house back to the Land Trust for an undisclosed sum of money and moved out.  Betsy 
Corner and Randy Kehler chose to not return to this home but rather to reside in another 
home on the Land Trust. (Leppzer, Elinoff, Sheen, & Turning Tide Productions, 1997) 
(Kehler, 1994)   
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 See later in this chapter for a more detailed description of his arrest and jail sentence.  
 
26
  An Affinity group is usually a small group of activists (between 3-20) who work together on a direct 
action.  Typically, affinity groups are nonhierarchical and utilize consensus decision-making.  Often, 
affinity groups are made up of trusted friends and are flexible temporary organizations.  Wally and Juanita 
Nelson (see later in this chapter) were members of one such affinity group. 
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3.2.4. Jail Sentences 
 
Since World War II, very few conscientious tax objectors have been tried in court 
because of their conscientious tax objection
27
.  Only two conscientious tax objectors, 
Katsuki James Otsuka and J. Tony Serra, have been jailed for failure to pay taxes since 
World War II.  According to N.W.T.R.C.C., most conscientious tax objectors have 
charges brought against them such as falsifying 1040 forms, failure to file, and contempt 
of court for refusing to produce records.   (NWTRCC Conference, personal 
communication, 2008)  Two such conscientious tax objectors, Juanita Nelson and Randy 
Kehler, were jailed for contempt of court.   
In 1949 Katsuki James Otsuka, an Earlham College student and United States 
citizen of Japanese descent, received a 90-day jail sentence and a $100 fine after refusing 
to pay $4.50 in federal income tax.  (Toledo Blade, 1950).  According to the 21 January 
1950 Toledo Blade, the amount resisted equaled 29 percent of his total federal income tax 
obligation.  (Toledo Blade, 1950).  Otsuka served an additional month in jail because he 
refused to pay the fine.  Otsuka, a Quaker, had previously served time in a federal 
penitentiary for another case related to his conscience.  During World War II, Otsuka 
applied for conscientious objector status and received a 1A-O classification, subjecting 
him to noncombatant service in the armed forces of the United States.  However, Otsuka 
felt that his religious beliefs prevented him from performing any kind of military service.  
Furthermore, he believed that he ought to have been more appropriately classified 4E, a 
conscientious objector subject to civilian work of national importance.  Subsequently, he 
refused to report for induction and surrendered himself at the office of the New York 
                                                        
27
 According to NWTRCC’s website, 54 conscientious tax objectors, since 1942, have been taken to court.  
(NWTRCC, 2012)  
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District Attorney.  Otsuka pleaded guilty to violating the Selective Service and Training 
Act of 1940.  He was sentenced to three years in a federal penitentiary.  He served his 
time and was released.  (Otsuka v. Hite, 1966)).
28
   
J. Tony Serra, a renowned criminal defense lawyer,
29
, who has represented Huey 
Newton of the Black Panther Party, members of the Symbionese Liberation Army, Judy 
Bari of Earth First!, and, perhaps most famously, Choi Soo Lee who was involved in a 
San Francisco Chinatown murder, was sentenced to ten months in federal penitentiary 
and a $100,000 fine (the amount the federal government claimed he owed for past 
resisted federal tax obligations) for his 2005 misdemeanor conviction of “failure to pay” 
for tax years 1998 and 1999.  (Hedemann, 2007) (Frankl, 2010).  This conviction was 
Lee’s third conviction as a conscientious tax objector.   Previously, Serra was convicted 
in 1976 for failing to file a tax return. Serra refused to file as protest to the Vietnam War.  
For this conviction, Serra served four months in Lompoc's Federal Correctional Institute.  
In  1986, Serra was again convicted of failure to file and was sentenced to one year in 
prison.  However, the sentence was suspended in favor of a five-year probation.  
According to a 2005 Los Angeles Times article, Serra filed but refused to pay his federal 
tax obligations from his 1986 conviction through his 2005 conviction (Romney, 2005).   
In July 2006, Serra again found himself sentenced to ten months in Lompoc Prison for 
failure to pay what Judge Spero, the presiding judge, called his “fair share” (Frankl, 2010, 
p. 236).  However, before sentencing Serra, Spero praised Serra for “his dedication to the 
cause of justice” (Frankl, 2010, p. 236).  To date, Serra has served time in federal prison, 
                                                        
28
 For more on Otsuka please see Chapter IV. 
 
29
 His autobiography asserts that he is the greatest counter-culture attorney. 
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served multiple probations, lost his license to practice law for 30 days and been convicted 
of numerous misdemeanors for his conscientious tax resistance (Frankl, 2010, p. 236).  
Juanita Nelson and her husband Wally
30
 are well-respected leaders in The 
Conscientious Tax Objector Movement.  The Nelsons began resisting and later refusing 
to pay their federal taxes in 1948 (see Figure1). Juanita Nelson wrote about one of her 
arrests in her work, A Matter of Freedom.  Nelson, writing about the reason for her arrest, 
stated, “in March I had been served with a summons to appear at the Internal Revenue 
office in Philadelphia with my records. Our procedure all along had been not to cooperate 
with the collection of information, and we felt we would probably not cooperate with an 
arrest” (Nelson, 1964, p. 18-19).  During her court appearance for failing to cooperate, 
the commissioner told her that he was empowered to imprison her for up to one year, but 
that he desired otherwise.   He offered her more time to choose to decide to comply with 
the law.  Nelson assumed that officers would again arrest her. However, later she learned 
that “charges had been dropped, since it could not be proven that I owed anything. (I was 
not, as a matter of fact, arrested for not paying the tax, but for contempt arising from 
refusal to show records.)   Still, in my Christmas mail there was a bill from the Internal 
Revenue Service for $950.01” (Nelson, 1964, p. 32).  
Figure 1. Wally and Juanita Nelson ( NWTRCC, 2012) 
 
 
 
                                                        
30
 Wallace Floyd Nelson (27 March 1909 – 23 May 2002) passed away at the age of 93 after more than 
fifty years of conscientious tax objection.  Nelson spent three and a half years in prison as a conscientious 
objector during World War II.  
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Betsy Corner and Randy Kehler, previously mentioned in this chapter, are 
conscientious tax objectors.  After the I.R.S. foreclosed on their home in order to recover 
back taxes, Corner and Kehler returned and occupied it.  During the protracted 
proceedings, the I.R.S. attempted twice to auction the Corner/ Kehler home.  The first 
auction resulted in no offers and the government became the owner by default.  During 
this period but before the second auction, both Corner and Kehler were arrested for 
trespassing on federal property.   After the second auction, Corner and Kehler returned to 
occupy the home and in 1991 were again arrested for the same charge.   In return for 
being released from jail, Corner agreed to not return to the house but Kehler refused.  
Kehler refused to cooperate and served six months in jail for contempt of court. (Leppzer 
et al., 1997)(“Colrain Journal; Peace Advocates Turn Tax Resistance Into a Ritual,” 
1992) 
 
3.3. Current Legal Cases of Interest  
 
 As I write this thesis, there are two ongoing court cases of interest.  Elizabeth 
Boardman, a Quaker, is suing the I.R.S.  Boardman argues that bearing witness and 
suffering levies and court orders is a long-standing practice of her religion.  She is an 
example of a conscientious tax objector who may be willing to compromise and support 
the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act.  Cindy Sheehan, a tax refuser and mother of 
Casey Sheehan, a member of the U.S. Armed Forces killed in Iraq, was summoned to 
court to answer questions regarding her conscientious tax objection.  Sheehan says that 
she will refuse to pay her income taxes until taxes are no longer used to fund unending 
wars.  She is an example of a conscientious tax objector who may be unwilling to 
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compromise and most likely would not support the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund 
Act.      
  
3.3.1. Elizabeth Boardman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
 The following is a brief explanation of Elizabeth Boardman’s claim in her 
Complaint and Claim for Injunctive Relief filed on 13 March 2012 against the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Plaintiff Elizabeth Boardman is a lifelong Quaker 
and peace activist.  She believes that her faith practice compels her to refuse the 
voluntary payment of the percentage of her federal income taxes that is directed towards 
war.  In tax years 2007 and 2008, she filed her full and complete federal income tax 
return.  She attached a correspondence to her federal income tax return form explaining 
that her conscience and religious beliefs prevented her from paying her full amount due.  
The correspondence included notice of deposit in a financial institution equaling the 
amount of her federal income taxes withheld.  Furthermore, the correspondence declared 
that she was willing to deliver the withheld funds for peaceful uses.   
 While Boardman believes that compelled payment of taxes used to fund war is a 
violation of her First Amendment right, she does not engage in the refusal of collection of 
assessed taxes and/or penalties.  She is not suggesting that as a Quaker she has the right 
to avoid paying any taxes and/or penalties/ interest that are imposed by Congress.  
Rather, she requests that the Court enjoin actions by the Commissioner that violate the 
Constitution and order that the Commissioner act in compliance with the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.  She believes that the I. R. S. can accommodate bona fide 
religious conscientious tax objectors without undue negative impact upon tax collection.   
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 Boardman’s position is that paying for war is against her religion and her 
conscience.  She will not voluntarily accede to and join in a system that makes war.  She 
understands that the I.R.S. will collect the amounts due by means such as levies and 
seizure of assets.  She argues that refusing to make tax payments for war, bearing witness 
on behalf of the Peace Testimony
31
 to the I.R.S. and to the world, and suffering levies and 
court orders is a long-standing practice of her religion.   
 Boardman argues that in tax years 2007 and 2008, the I.R.S. needlessly burdened 
her religious practice by determining her tax resistance as “frivolity.”  In 2007, Boardman 
wrote to the I.R.S. stating, 
I am not a tax evader, I am not a libertarian, and I am not opposed to taxation. I 
paid half of my tax bill for 2007, and would pay it all, if all went to the constructive 
social programs our country desperately needs.  I am a long-time Quaker pacifist 
who has made a considered decision to commit civil disobedience by refusing 
voluntarily to pay the half of my income taxes that are earmarked for support of 
military activities, including the killing of human beings. . . In my effort to hold 
true to my deepest religious beliefs in pursuing this course, I have received much 
misinformation and (perhaps deliberate) misdirection from the Tax Advocacy 
Service and the I.R.S., on the phone and in writing. . . As a result, before I could 
file an appropriate appeal within the I.R.S. system, the balance due (with penalty 
                                                        
31
Pacifism has been of central importance to Quakerism since the religion was founded. Accused of 
participating in a religious uprising in 1660, Quaker founders, led by George Fox, issued a formal 
declaration that became the seed witness of the Quaker Peace Testimony: “All bloody principles and 
practices, we, as to our own particulars, do utterly deny, with all outward wars and strife and fightings with 
outward weapons, for any end or under any pretense whatsoever. And this is our testimony to the whole 
world. ... That the spirit of Christ, by which we are guided, is not changeable, so as once to command us 
from a thing as evil and again to move unto it; and we do certainly know, and so testify to the world, that 
the spirit of Christ, which leads us into all Truth, will never move us to fight and war against any man with 
outward weapons, neither for the kingdom of Christ nor for the kingdoms of this world” (Pacific Yearly 
Meeting, 2012) 
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and interest) on my 2007 tax bill, a total of $1159.49, was levied by the I.R.S. from 
the Northern California Community Loan Fund. . . Although this levy has taken 
place, I have not received any “notice of deficiency” from the I.R.S. in relation to 
my 2007 taxes. . . My concerns cannot be addressed by the Collection Due Process 
or the  Collections Appeal Program.  My claim is not frivolous (Boardman, 2012). 
 
 In connection with a frivolous penalty letter, Boardman enclosed a letter in which 
she stated: 
I believe that it is an inalienable human right of conscience I am a long-time 
Quaker pacifist who has made a considered decision to commit civil disobedience 
by refusing voluntarily to pay the half of my income taxes that are earmarked for 
support of military activities, including the killing of human beings. . . In my effort 
to hold true to my deepest religious beliefs in pursuing this course, I have received 
much misinformation and (perhaps deliberate) misdirection from the Tax Advocacy 
Service and the I.R.S., on the phone and in writing.  As a result, before I could file 
an appropriate appeal within the I.R.S. system, the balance due (with penalty and 
interest) on my 2007 tax bill, a total of $1159.49, was levied by the I.R.S. from the 
Northern California Community Loan Fund. . . Although this levy has taken place, 
I have not received any “notice of deficiency” from the I.R.S. in relation to my 
2007 taxes.  My concerns cannot be addressed by the Collection Due Process or the  
 Collections Appeal Program.  My claim is not frivolous.  (Boardman, 2012) 
 
  
  58 
In connection with tax year 2008 tax return, Boardman enclosed a letter in which she 
stated: 
I believe that it is an inalienable human right of conscience to refuse any form of 
participation in war, be it by military service in person or by payment of war-
supporting taxes. . . The freedom of individual conscience is protected by 
international treaties and covenants that are signed and ratified by the United States 
of America. My human right to freedom of conscience is violated when I am 
coerced to pay taxes that are used in support of military activity. . . I understand 
that under current federal law, my refusal voluntarily to pay for war can be 
characterized as an act of civil disobedience. However, I believe that taking this 
action, holding back and putting in escrow a portion of my income tax obligation, is 
entirely proper under international human rights law.  (Boardman, 2012) 
 
 Later Boardman wrote to the I.R.S. stating that she refused to voluntarily 
contribute to the support of the Department of Defense and that she desired to obtain a 
Tax Court determination.   After she was denied her request for a Tax Court, she wrote to 
the I.R.S., “Just to keep the record clear, I wish to remind you now that I have objected 
on the phone (3/14/10) and by letter (3/16/10) to any hearing which will result in denial 
of my right to appeal to a tax court” (Boardman, 2012). 
 In her Complaint and Claim for Injunctive Relief, Boardman claims that she did not 
receive notices that the I.R.S. was obligated to provide as part of its procedures.  
Furthermore, she claims that the I.R.S. improperly levied her Social Security benefits 
while disputes were pending.  After numerous conflicting conversations with different 
I.R.S. agents, which included threats of imminent seizures to suggestions that she had 
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given up her right to seek judicial review in Tax Court, Boardman acquiesced and paid 
the amount demanded by the I.R.S. on account of her tax obligations for the 2008 tax 
year.  However, Boardman hopes to recover her costs and disbursements related to this 
case in court.   
 Boardman alleges in her court documents that the I.R.S. is selecting practitioners of 
religious conscientious tax objection for threats, punishment, and discriminatory 
bureaucratic action.  She believes that these discriminatory actions are intentional, and, 
deliberate towards members of religious minorities.  Therefore, she asserts that the I.R.S. 
is in violation of the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment.  Furthermore under 
R.F.R.A., the I.R.S., she alleges, should be required to establish alternative procedures for 
handling disputes, claims, collection, and litigation adverse to taxpayers who provide full 
and honest disclosures of relevant information, and who state bona fide reasons of 
religion or conscience for failure to pay or refusals to pay their full tax liability.  
Boardman alleges that such alternative procedures need not involve more expense or 
delay in connection with tax collection from religious conscientious tax objectors than is 
incurred under the present system.  As it stands today, Boardman believes that she has no 
adequate remedy at law.  Thus, she is requesting that the Court issue a permanent 
injunction ordering the I.R.S. to comply with the Free Exercise clause of the First 
Amendment and with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as amended in 
1998. as requesting that the I.R.S. comply with the following principles:  
a. The Commissioner shall put into operation procedures for processing disputes, 
claims, collections and litigation adverse to taxpayers who refuse to pay taxes 
because of conscience or religion that are respectful, efficient, transparent and 
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minimally burdensome and that lead to Tax Court determinations upon taxpayer 
request; 
b. No costs or punishment shall be inflicted, threatened or sought against 
conscientious or religious war tax resisters in excess of costs or punishment strictly 
required by Congressional enactment. (Boardman, 2012) 
As already noted, Boardman’s ongoing case is worth examining because she is a 
religious conscientious tax objector who does not engage in tax refusal.  Boardman is an 
example of a conscientious tax objector who may support the Religious Freedom Peace 
Tax fund Act.  Further, should the Act become law, she may choose to register as a 
conscientious tax objector.   
 
 
3.3.2. Cindy Sheehan Case 
 
 Cindy Sheehan is one leader of the contemporary peace movement.  Sheehan, 
who is often called Peace Mom by her fellow pacifists, is the mother of Casey Sheehan.  
Casey was an American soldier sent to Iraq in April 2004.  Only five days after he arrived 
in Sadr City, Iraq, Casey and seven of his fellow soldiers were killed on 4 April 2004.  
Casey died at the age of 24 and posthumously was awarded the Bronze Star Medal and 
the Purple Heart.  After her son’s death, Sheehan met with President George H.W. Bush.  
After the meeting, which Sheehan is quoted as saying, “was the worst of her life” 
(Sheehan, 2012) she created the organization Gold Star Families for Peace
32
.  
Subsequently, Sheehan began a 26-day nonviolent direct action witness project directly 
across from President George W. Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas.  This action brought 
                                                        
32
 Gold Star Families are families in which any member of the immediate family member died in a combat 
zone while a member of any branch of the armed forces. (Gold Star Families For Peace, 2012)  
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widespread publicity and attention to her cause. Continuing her activism, Sheehan first 
became a conscientious tax objector and then a vocal tax refuser.  Since 2004, Sheehan 
has refused all taxes, penalties, and interest assessed to her by the I.R.S.  On 19 April 
2012, Sheehan attended a scheduled court hearing regarding her refusal to pay taxes and 
her refusal to supply the I.R.S. with requested information.  In a pre-court statement, 
Sheehan read the following words: 
On April 04, 2004, my oldest son, Casey Sheehan, was killed in Iraq and my heart 
and life were shattered.  We always disagreed with George Bush and opposed the 
US’s entries into Afghanistan and then Iraq, but on May 1, 2005, the Downing 
Street Minutes were discovered about a meeting held at Number 10 Downing 
Street on July 23, 2002 between Tony Blair and a member of the Foreign Service 
who had met in Washington DC with then National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice. . . The minutes explicitly stated that there was no intelligence 
indicating an immediate need to invade Iraq, but the invasion, at that point was, “a 
foregone conclusion.”  In today’s fast food, instant message culture, all of this 
may seem like ancient history, but to the one-million plus people who have been 
slaughtered for lies, imperial conquest and this government’s lust for and devotion 
to war, and all the ones that their unnecessary death left behind, the pain will 
always be fresh. . . The US government took something invaluable precious and 
priceless from me and the murder has not abated with a new administration and 
not one person who is responsible for the mayhem has been prosecuted. . . I will 
refuse to pay my income taxes until the time, and I hope it’s soon, that our money 
is used to fully fund a national health care system; free and fully funded 
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education; housing for all; and a more equitable distribution of wealth—and not 
used for these unending wars. . . Some people ask me if I pay my state taxes, and 
the answer is: not while my state sends billions of dollars to the federal 
government for its war OF terror while slashing education and other essential 
social services.  Although my protest is not against, nor is my beef with the I.R.S., 
I know for sure that the I.R.S. is used to prosecute political enemies of the state 
and as I am one of the most outspoken critics of US foreign policy, I believe this 
is happening to me as this nation is now embarking on further oppressive 
measures against dissent and I will not cooperate with my own persecution. 
(Sheehan, 2012)  
 
Following the meeting with the I.R.S., Cindy Sheehan sent a Press Release on 
behalf of her sister and herself regarding the I.R.S. procedures against her.  In the press 
release, Sheehan stated,  
We recently have received your “Notice of Levy,” and “SUMMONS.” 
Let us be clear why we are not paying your bill. . . .  For almost five decades of 
our lives, we sisters were taxpaying, law-abiding citizens. Sure, we got the 
occasional traffic or parking tickets, but we dutifully paid them or went to traffic 
school. I.R.S. Agent, can you imagine in your Revenuer’s heart the agony we felt 
when we realized that we had funded the murder of our own dear Casey? As our 
awareness grew, so did our disgust with our complicity in this system as the body 
count for totally innocent civilians rose. We now feel that for at least 30 years of 
taxpaying perfidy, we funded the murders and torture of millions! The only way 
we could live with ourselves was to stop being accessories to our government’s 
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war crimes and crimes against humanity. . . To honor Casey's needless sacrifice 
and to protect others, we will not pay these bills. . . . our membership in the 
human race demands that we withhold money from such a homicidal, nay 
genocidal cabal as the US government.  Scores of people in this nation have taken 
the principled stand that we take and we feel that our moral compasses trump your 
“laws.” We could have taken the strategy of only paying a portion of our taxes 
like some do, but we feel we have no control over where our money is spent.  
If Citizens United (Citizens United v. The Federal Elections Commission) can 
claim that money is Free Speech and it can spend freely on its political causes, 
then we feel we have the same right to withhold our money in an act of moral 
courage . . . We will never again co-operate with the USA in its crimes against 
peace. . . .  We strongly reiterate: we won’t help fund the terrorism of this 
government abroad and the economic terrorism of this government here at home. 
(Sheehan, 2012) 
As already noted Cindy Sheehan’s publicity and ongoing conversations with the 
I.R.S. regarding her tax refusal is worth following.  Sheehan, a tax refuser, is an example 
of a conscientious tax objector who may not support the Religious Freedom Peace Tax 
Fund Act, and should The Act become law, may not register for the classification.   
 
3.4. Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act 
 One possible transformation of the conflict between freedom of conscience and 
required taxation may be passing The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act.  The Act 
is a proposed bill that would create a trust fund for registered conscientious tax objectors.  
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By looking at the history of The Peace Tax Fund Movement and describing how the 
proposed bill may work, the following section unpacks how The Act may help relieve the 
conflict.  Through this discussion we begin to discover some of the reasons that many 
conscientious objectors do not support the bill.   
 
3.4.1. History of the Peace Tax Fund Movement 
 As this is a thesis for the Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program at the 
University of Oregon, I was excited to discover that Representative Edith Green of 
Oregon was the first to introduce into Congress the idea of a congressionally mandated 
peace fund for conscientious tax objectors.  Representative Green’s bill was called the 
United Nations Investments in Peace Act of 1958.  She introduced the bill on 1 May1958 
and Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota introduced the identical bill on 24 July 1958 
on the Senate floor.  Section 4 of the bill established a credit, not to exceed two percent, 
for amounts contributed to the newly established United Nations Investments in Peace 
Fund in the United Nations.  In the bill, the purpose of the national defense is said to,  
Avoid war rather than to fight; . . .and it is in the national interest to encourage 
[others] . . .to contribute in time, energy, interest, and money toward the 
achievement of lasting peace through the removal of the basic causes of 
dissension among nations. (N.C.P.T.F., 2012)  
 The Civilian Income Tax Act of 1961, drafted by the Peace Committee of Pacific 
Yearly Meeting of Friends, meant to establish a device for all conscientious objectors to 
have their income taxes paid to UNICEF.  This bill was not adopted; yet another group of 
Friends met in Michigan during the Vietnam War to work on the creation of the 
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legislation that would become the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund.  Two couples in 
the Ann Arbor, Michigan, Friends Meeting - Johann and Frances Eliot, and Robert and 
Margaret Blood – decided that they could no longer allow their federal income tax dollars 
to be used to fund the Vietnam War.  They were conflicted about how to remain true to 
their values and conscience.  The two couples joined the ever-growing number of 
conscientious tax objectors in the United States.  However, simply refusing to pay a 
portion of their federal income tax did not resolve their personal conflicts.  They began 
work on creating a law that would recognize the right of conscientious objection to 
military taxation.  The two couples persuaded Thomas Towe, a law student at the 
University of Michigan Law School and a member of the Ann Arbor Friends’ Meeting, to 
prepare a brief that could one day be submitted to the United States Congress in support 
of this legislation.  
 In June of 1970 the Lake Erie Yearly Meeting (L.E.Y.M.)
33
 approved a minute
34
 
that asked Friends to consider the implication of paying for war through federal taxes.    
The approved minute was shared at all monthly meetings in L.E.Y.M. David Basett, a 
physician and conscientious objector, was a member of the Ann Arbor Friends’ meeting.  
After hearing the minute, he and his wife, Miyoko Inoye Bassett, decided that their 
conscience no longer allowed them to pay their full tax obligation.   They decided to 
                                                        
33
 The structure of the Friends Meeting, according to The Lake Erie Yearly Meeting is as follows, “The 
Yearly Meeting comprises the members of its constituent Monthly Meetings who come together annually 
to explore and pursue their common purposes. The work of the Yearly Meeting is conducted by its 
committees and corporately during the annual gathering, which is also referred to as the Yearly Meeting 
session. While the Yearly Meeting’s officers and committees broadly parallel those of a Monthly Meeting, 
additional officers and committees are responsible for the conduct of the annual gathering.”  (PCM, 2012)  
 
34
 According to the Bethesda Friends Meeting, a minute is a “. . . statement of belief that an individual or 
group would like to record for others to see, both now and in the future about a certain topic or person. This 
is recorded in the minutes of our business meetings and is held as a permanent record of our Meeting's 
convictions. It will become part of the history of this Meeting. It can be used to stimulate thought and 
discussion among other Meetings and/or to inform various decision-makers beyond our Meeting of our 
deeply held beliefs” (Bethesda Friends, 2012)  
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begin withholding the portion of their federal taxes used for military expenditures.  Not 
only did the Bassetts begin withholding, they started discussing with others the 
possibility of legislative change.  They began to speak with professors at the University 
of Michigan, where they studied, and soon became connected with Professor Joseph Sax 
at the Law School.  Professor Sax had interviewed a number of American draft resisters 
who had moved to Sweden rather than fight in the Vietnam War.  Professor Sax 
introduced the Bassetts to Michael Hall, a University of Michigan Law Student.  Using 
the preliminary work done by Thomas Towe, in January of 1971, Basset, Sax, and Hall 
began creating the early drafts of what became the World Peace Tax Fund Bill. 
 Professor Sax suggested that the proposed legislation be based on a trust fund 
mechanism.  The trust fund would be set up in such a way that any citizen of the United 
States who conscientiously opposes participation in all war can be recognized by the US 
government as a conscientious tax objector.   The legislation proposed that the same 
criteria used by the Selective Service System for administering conscientious objector 
status be used for conscientious tax objector status.  These conscientious tax objectors 
would pay their full federal tax obligation on income, estate, or gift taxes.  Congress 
would appropriate these monies only for non-military purposes.   
 Over the next year, Bassett, Hall, and Sax garnered support for the World Peace 
Tax Fund Bill from their local Friends Meeting and the Ann Arbor Interfaith Council for 
Peace.  Buoyed by this support, Bassett took the WPTFB to Washington, D.C., and spoke 
with organizations affiliated with the historic peace churches (Brethren, Mennonite, and 
Quaker).  Bassett received support from Delton Franz, the director of the Washington 
office of the Mennonite Central Committee (M.C.C).  After receiving support from the 
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M.C.C. Washington D.C. office, Bassett set up a meeting of interested parties hosted by 
the Friends Committee on National Legislation.  At this meeting in January of 1972, 
Representative Ronald Dellums announced that he was prepared to introduce the World 
Peace Tax Fund Bill into Congress as well as work to find additional cosponsors.   The 
group also decided to formally create an organization solely dedicated to the creation of 
the World Peace Tax Fund Bill.  The National Council for a World Peace Tax Fund 
(N.C.W.P.T.F.) would continue to be housed in Ann Arbor until sufficient resources 
could be obtained to open an office in Washington, D.C. 
 On 17April 1972, the World Peace Tax Fund Bill was introduced as H.R. 14414 
with Ronald Dellums as the lead sponsor and nine cosponsors.
35
  Ultimately, the bill was 
pigeonholed in committee and received little traction.  However, during 1975, the 
N.C.P.T.F. set up a permanent office in Washington, D.C.  The office was located in the 
Friends Meeting of Washington, near the Dupont Circle.  During the next few years, the 
N.C.P.T.F. had three dedicated staff persons: Bill Samuel, Sister Mary Rae Waller, and 
William Strong.  During the same year, 1975, Representative Dellums introduces the 
W.P.T.F. Bill (H.R. 4897) in the House of Representatives for the second time.  Eighteen 
co-sponsors joined him.  
In September of 1982, Marian Franz became the executive director of 
N.C.W.P.T.F.  She remained the executive director until 2005.  As the executive director, 
she was the lead lobbyist for the Peace Tax Fund bill.  During her leadership, the 
N.C.P.T.F. saw changes to the name, wording, and Congressional support for the bill.  In 
1982, the N.C.W. P.T.F. changed its name to National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund 
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 Mr. Rosenthal, Mr. Kastenmeier, Mr. Rangel, Ms. Abzug, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Diggs, Mr. 
Bingham, and Mr. Conyers 
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(N.C.P.T.F.).  In 1985, in response to growing awareness that international peace tax 
organizations are uncomfortable with the use of the term “world” in the bill’s name, the 
N.C.P.T.F. approved changing the bill’s name from World Peace Tax Fund Bill to U.S. 
Peace Tax Fund Bill.  In 1998, in order to emphasize the First Amendment right to 
freedom of religious expression, the U.S. Peace Tax Fund Bill changed its name to the 
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Bill.  This same year, Representative John Lewis 
became the lead congressional sponsor; he remains the bill’s lead sponsor.  
On 17 March 2011, Representative John Lewis introduced The Religious 
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act of 2011 (H.R. 1191).  H.R. 1191 currently has seven 
cosponsors: Rep. John Conyers, Rep. Raul Grijalva, Rep. Rush Holt, Rep. Jesse Jackson 
Jr., Rep. Ron Paul, Rep. Fortney Pete Stark, and Rep. Lynn Woolsey.  The Bill was 
referred to the House Ways and Means Committee.  
 
3.4.2. How the Bill Works  
The current bill proposes to amend the Internal Revenue Code so that 
conscientious objectors’ income, estate, and gift taxes would be utilized solely for non-
military purposes.  The Act would create the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund, a trust 
fund within the United States’ Treasury.  In this trust fund, the full amount of the 
conscientious objector’s tax payments would be placed. The current bill makes the 
Secretary of the Treasury responsible for depositing the conscientious objector’s tax 
payments into the trust fund.  Further, the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for 
allocating the money within the trust fund to non-military purposes.  For the purposes of 
this bill, the following activities and programs are deemed military purposes under the 
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Act: the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Department of 
Defense, and the Selective Service System. Further, certain other government agencies 
have particular departments associated with the military, which would not qualify for 
access to the trust fund money. (N.C.P.T.F., 2012) 
The bill provides that the Internal Revenue Service would determine who meets 
the statutory definition of a “conscientious objector” using the same process as the 
Selective Service uses to apply the Military Selective Service Act’s exemption.  Further, 
the identification procedures will only be used by the I.R.S. when it conducts an audit.  
Meaning, that only if someone is audited by the I.R.S., will her/ his self-classification as a 
registered conscientious tax objector be questioned. (N.C.P.T.F., 2012)  
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY 
4.1. Introduction to the Case Study 
 The purpose of this case study is to examine how the conscientious tax objector 
movement relates to the idea of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund as well as to 
consider the effects of enacting the law.  Explaining the nature of the community’s 
relationship to the fund helps clarify how the uneven support for this method of resistance 
manifests itself outside the movement.  This relationship is closely aligned with the 
effectiveness of legislative support for conscientious tax objection.  As the movement is 
not firmly in support of the fund, members of Congress are not effectively encouraged to 
be actively involved in a creative conflict resolution process.
36
   
 
4.1.1. Information Sources 
 My case study originated in November of 2008 when I attended the annual 
meeting of the National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee.  During what 
became an eye-opening long weekend, I hosted Kathy Kelly, the co-coordinator of 
Voices for Creative Nonviolence and a personal hero, at my house for two nights.  I also 
attended the multi-day conference where I had the opportunity to have one-on-one 
conversations with many of the leaders of the movement.  At that time in my life, I was 
learning about new methods of nonviolent direct action and assessing whether I wanted 
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 This is an observation from my personal conversations with conscientious tax objectors.  For the duration 
of this chapter, any factual item that is not specifically cited should be assumed to be information gathered 
in the field.   
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to participate. I thought conscientious tax objection was an interesting method of 
nonviolent resistance for these reasons: 
 Form of resistance that is directed at diminishing the United States’ military 
industrial complex  
 Form of resistance that is unabashedly bottom-up grassroots 
 Form of resistance in line with the teachings of the nonviolent Jesus of Nazareth 
To initiate this study, I conducted informational interviews with 12 current and 
former conscientious tax objectors who became my early informants.  I researched 
relevant case law and statutory authority, the theological rationale for pacifism and 
conscientious tax objection (concentrating on my own Christian faith tradition), and the 
history of tax resistance in the colonies and the United States.  After completing my 
initial research, I scheduled formal interviews with 42 current and former conscientious 
tax objectors.  I re-interviewed some of the original 12 informants.    
 
4.2. Methods 
 This section is a summary of how I gathered information over the course of this 
project.  These methods include direct observations of the National War Tax Resistance 
Coordinating Committee’s annual meeting, summaries of relevant case law and statutes; 
review of tax resistance organizations’ websites, informal conversations with current and 
former conscientious tax objectors, research and study into Christian pacifism, and 
formal interviews with conscientious tax objectors.  During the course of this research my 
knowledge about the methods of conscientious tax objection drastically improved.  As I 
became more connected with the conscientious tax objector movement I noticed a shift in 
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my bias.  During the course of my research I spent time in the Southern Hebron Hills of 
Occupied Palestine and in the poorer neighborhoods of Cairo, Egypt.  I witnessed first 
hand the direct effects of United States military spending.  All of these experiences 
helped me to gain access to prominent internationally respected activists as well as 
influential members of the conscientious tax objector movement.   
 
4.2.1. Information Gathering Methods 
 I have already mentioned the six main sources of information used in this thesis: 
observations at the National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committees’ annual 
meeting, informal informational interviews with current and former conscientious tax 
objectors, formal interviews with current and former conscientious tax objectors, relevant 
case law and statutory authority, Christian pacifism literature, and tax resistance 
literature.  
 Kathy Kelly stimulated my interest in the nonviolent direct action resistance 
method of conscientious tax objection as well as in solidarity and witnessing in the 
Middle East.  Kelly is a long time peace activist and a Catholic Worker from Chicago, 
Illinois.  Kelly and other members of Voices for Creative Nonviolence lived in Baghdad, 
Iraq, during the 2003 “Shock and Awe” bombing.  In 2004, she “crossed the line” at Fort 
Benning
37
 and served three months in federal prison.  During the late 1980’s, Kelly was 
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 “Crossing the line” is the term used in the School of America’s Watch (SOA Watch) movement when 
someone trespasses into Fort Benning during the annual protest to close the Western Hemisphere Institute 
for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. 
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sentenced to one year in federal prison for plowshare
38
 nonviolent direct actions at a 
number of nuclear missile silo sites.  Furthermore, since 1980, Kelly has refused to pay 
all forms of federal income tax.   
 During the time that Kelly spent as a guest in my home, we talked about the 
Catholic Worker movement, nonviolent direct action, tax resistance, and, most 
importantly, solidarity and witnessing in the Middle East.  Kelly encouraged me to look 
into joining the non-governmental organization, Christian Peacemaker Teams (C.P.T.) as 
a way to learn first-hand the effects of the United States’ military industrial complex.   
Many of our conversations were centered on the same theme: as a follower of the 
nonviolent Jesus, was I really living the lifestyle that I professed to support?  As a pacifist 
and someone who prayed for peace, why was I paying for war?  Kelly, gently yet firmly, 
encouraged me to look inward and discover how I was contributing to war.  In Kelly, I 
found a woman who not only professes an ideal, but also lives that ideal.  Kelly 
encouraged me to continue to research conscientious tax objection not only from a 
theoretical perspective but as a tangible reality.   
 After attending the general meeting, I remained connected to local and national 
conscientious tax objectors.  I continued to engage in dialogue and self-introspection 
regarding participation in war.  I found myself more entrenched in nonviolent direct 
actions: I engaged in civil disobedience, joined the Hang Up On War campaign, and 
traveled to South Hebron Hills of the Occupied Palestine and poverty stricken 
neighborhoods of Cairo, Egypt.   During these travels and actions, I continually engaged 
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 According to the preeminent pacifist and conscientious tax objector, John Dear S.J., a plowshare action is 
a nonviolent direct action.  The witnesses for peace are driven by “ a single vision . . . of the great oracle of 
Isaiah 2: ‘They shall beat their swords into plowshares and study war no more’” (Dear, 2009)  
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in moving conversations with current and former conscientious tax objectors.  The 
conversations ultimately followed the same pattern: 
 What led her/him to become a conscientious tax objector? 
 How did her/his family and friends react to this action? 
 Why did s/he choose to continue the resistance after the I.R.S. assessed a penalty 
and or fine? 
 What does it feel like to know that her/his conscience is free? 
 Is tax resistance relevant and/or effective? 
 What does it mean to be a follower of the nonviolent Jesus while continuing to 
pay for the death and destruction caused by the military industrial complex? 
As I continued to have the same type of conversation with very different individuals, I 
realized my own interest and desire to learn more about conscientious tax objection.  
Each conscientious tax objector that I encountered encouraged me to remain in contact, 
and I took her/him up on the offer.  I received many email updates and blog postings 
from these conscientious tax objectors informing me about current and upcoming 
nonviolent direct action campaigns.  
 While the initial purpose of these conversations was solely personal, I soon 
decided that my interest in conscientious tax objection was worth investing my time and 
resources.  I began to consider exploring the topic in depth for my Master’s thesis.  After 
some initial literature research, I asked each of my initial contacts if s/he would be 
willing to participate in more formal interviews for this project.  With a few exceptions 
everyone agreed and referred me to additional conscientious tax objectors.  After 
concluding the interviews and my research, I decided that I had gathered enough 
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information to complete this thesis.   While a more formal quantitative research survey of 
current and former conscientious tax objectors might provide additional information, it 
would lack the richness of the personal conversations that produced much of the 
information for this thesis.  Conversing one-on-one over a shared meal, engaging in 
nonviolent direct actions as part of affinity groups, or engaging in informal phone and e-
mail conversations with current and former conscientious tax objectors has informed my 
conclusions. 
 For example, while participating in school patrol in the South Hebron Hills of 
Occupied Palestine, I learned from Sari, (name changed to protect identity) a permanent 
member of C.P.T., that she was a committed pacifist.  In her opinion, the best way to 
resist paying for the military industrial complex was to live simply.  Her belief in the 
nonviolent Jesus informed her decisions.  She quoted from the work of Sister José 
Hobday (2006)
39, “I think that it is the promise of freedom that really attracts us to 
simplicity, that it is the desire to expand and explore”(p. 4).  Sari went on to say that 
Hobday says, “Theologically, it is refusing to worship the idol and insisting on the 
freedom to worship the one true God.  If making and spending more and more money is 
the cultural way, then simple living is taking a powerful stand against it” (p. 88-89).   I 
know that Sari said these words to me, because I wrote them in my journal later that 
night.  Her profound emphasis on simple living as a form of nonviolent direct action 
resistance had an enormous impact on my consideration of tax resistance.  By observing 
the freedom that Sari had by not paying into the military industrial complex, I began to 
understand the power conscience can have.   Conversing with Sari helped to shape my 
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 Sister José Hobday was an influential spiritual lecturer, author, and storyteller.  Hobday, a Sister of the 
Franciscan Order, is well known for her many books on prayer and spirituality.  Hobday was a leader in the 
Catholic simple living lifestyle.  
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conclusion that simple living is every bit as powerful a resistance as the other methods 
detailed in this thesis.   
 Still, not all difficulties were overcome.  Many conscientious tax objectors, who I 
very much desired to interview, did not return my phone calls, e-mails, or postal letters.  
Some individuals were less than forthcoming with the details of their method of 
resistance, understandable, but still discouraging.  Others told in depth stories of events in 
their life over the informal settings of shared meals, and I failed to document the exact 
details.  My own embarrassment kept me from asking clarifying questions in some 
occasions.   Perhaps the greatest difficulty I had was learning how to phrase my questions 
to get the most helpful responses.  The later, formal interviews produced the greatest 
amount of usable data.  However, I found each interview to be instrumental in helping 
define this thesis as well as my own personal relationship with conscientious tax 
objection.  
 
4.2.2. Formal Interviewee Descriptions 
 The 42 conscientious tax objectors with whom I spoke are geographically diverse 
yet for the most part socio-economically and culturally alike (see table 2 on p. 77).    My 
selection of these particular conscientious tax objectors was based on prior contacts.  
Having already communicated with 12 of the 42, my data set may have been limited by 
my selection method since I asked my initial contacts for introductions to additional 
conscientious tax objectors.   However, after asking each interviewee about her/ his 
feeling on the cultural and socio-economic make up of most conscientious tax objectors, I 
think the dearth of minorities, including, members of the permanent poor class, in my 
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data set is comparable to the statistics of all conscientious tax objectors. Andrea 
Ayvazian, a long-time conscientious tax objector, says in the documentary, Path of 
Greatest Resistance: tax resistance in Western Massachusetts, that  “there are a lot of us 
in the middle class, and I would say there are more people that are choosing to live very 
simply and are making decisions to reduce their income, but in terms of the numbers of 
tax resisters that grew up working class, I don’t know” (Weye, 1992).  Her lack of 
awareness of this group may substantiate my conclusion that most conscientious tax 
objectors are from the same socio-economic status.  
Table 2:  Basic demographic statistics for each conscientious tax objector 
RESISTER EDUCATION F/M RACE 
YEARS 
OBJECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELIGION 
1 Masters F White 30+ Low-Income R. Catholic 
2 Masters F White 30+ Low-Income Quaker 
3 Undergrad F White 15+ Low-Income 
Jewish/ 
Quaker 
4 J.D. F Persian 1 Middle Class Quaker 
5 Masters F White 1 Middle Class R. Catholic 
6 Masters M White 1 Middle Class R. Catholic 
7 Undergrad F White 25+ Low-Income n/a 
8 Ph.D. M White 35 Upper Middle Class Quaker 
9 Undergrad F White 30_ Low-Income Mennonite 
10 Undergrad F White 20+ Low-Income Mennonite 
11 Masters F White 20+ Low-Income Mennonite 
12 Ph.D. F White 40+ Low-Income R. Catholic 
13 Ph.D. M White varies Middle Class Mennonite 
14 Ph.D. M White varies Middle Class Quaker 
15 M.D. M White 30+ Low-Income Quaker 
16 Masters M White 20+ Low-Income n/a 
17 Masters M White 15+ Low-Income Jewish 
18 Undergrad F White 2 Low-Income R. Catholic 
19 Masters M White 5 Low-Income R. Catholic 
20 Masters F White varies Upper Middle Class R. Catholic 
21 Masters M White 15 Low-Income n/a 
22 Undergrad M Asian 2 Middle class n/a 
23 Undergrad M White 3 Middle Class Quaker 
24 Masters F White 10 Low-Income Mennonite 
25 Undergrad F White 20 Middle Class Mennonite 
26 Masters F White 10 Middle Class Nazarene 
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27 Ph.D. M Black 26 Upper Middle Class Pentecostal 
28 Ph.D. F Black 30 Upper Middle Class Pentecostal 
29 J.D. F White 15+ Low-Income Jewish 
30 J.D./ Ph.D. F White 10 Upper Middle Class Methodist 
31 M.D. M White 6 Upper Middle Class ELCA 
32 M.D. M White 6 Upper Middle Class ELCA 
33 Masters F Black 1 Middle Class S. Baptist 
34 Masters M White 1 Middle Class Methodist 
35 Undergrad F White 5 Middle Class Methodist 
36 Masters F White 6 Middle Class Episcopalian 
37 Masters F White 15 Middle Class R. Catholic 
38 Masters F White 3 Middle Class Mennonite 
39 Masters F Hispanic 2 Middle Class Methodist 
40 Undergrad F White 2 Middle Class Nazarene 
41 Masters F White 4 Middle Class ELCA 
42 Undergrad M White 15 Middle Class Mennonite 
 
Table 2 shows some basic demographic statistics for each conscientious tax 
objector whom I interviewed. I asked each conscientious tax objector her/his highest 
level of education, the gender s/he identifies with, her/his race, the number of years s/he 
has resisted taxes, her/ his current socio- economic status, and the religion(s) with which 
s/he most identifies.   
The majority of conscientious tax objectors in my data set, 26 of the 42, are 
female.    The data set includes one female who identifies as Hispanic, two females who 
identify as African American, one male who identifies as African American, one male 
who identifies as Asian American, and one female who identifies as Persian.  The 
remaining 36 conscientious tax objectors identify as White.   
The data set includes 15 conscientious tax objectors who identify as low-income, 
19 conscientious tax objectors who identify as middle class, and eight who identify as 
upper middle class.  It should be noted that many conscientious tax objectors, whom I 
interviewed, might currently identify themselves as low-income, yet many were not 
raised as part of the permanent poor class, but, in many cases, as upper-middle class.  For 
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example, conscientious tax objector #21 states that she has been low-income since 1982.  
However, prior to choosing the simple living lifestyle, she was raised in an affluent 
suburb of St. Paul, Minnesota, and graduated from the University of Oregon with a 
Master’s degree in Education.  Furthermore, she maintains her low-income status by 
working substantially less than full-time as a professional textbook editor and freelance 
journalist.  Conscientious tax objector #29 states that she has been low-income since the 
mid-1990’s.  However, prior to her adoption of the simple living lifestyle, she was raised 
in an affluent Jewish family in New York City and graduated from Harvard Law School.  
Furthermore, she owns her home, with no mortgage, and grows and raises most of her 
dietary needs, such as organic vegetables and fruits and protein (in the form of free-range 
chickens) on her property.   Moreover, she maintains her low-income status by offering 
her legal services on the gift economy
40
.   The lowest education level of the conscientious 
tax objectors I interviewed was an undergraduate college degree.  Of the data set, 11 of 
the 42 conscientious tax objectors’ highest level of education is an undergraduate degree.  
19 of the conscientious tax objectors’ highest level of education is a Masters degree. 11 
of the conscientious tax objectors’ highest level of education is a terminal degree (J.D., 
M.D., and Ph.D.).   One conscientious tax objector, #30, has both a J.D. and a Ph.D.  
I chose to ask only with what religion the conscientious tax objector currently 
identifies her/himself rather than ask in what, if any, religion the conscientious tax 
objector was raised.  The data set includes eight Roman Catholics, six Quakers, eight 
Mennonites, two Jews, two Nazarenes, two Pentecostals, two Methodists, two 
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 Tree Bressen, a well-known and respected facilitator, describes her practice of the gift economy as, “I do 
not have any set fees for my work.  I ask groups to pay me an amount that feels good and right and fair to 
them, that they can afford, and that they can give joyfully. The same request applies to individuals 
attending public workshops” (Bressen, 2012).  
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Evangelical Church of America Lutherans, one Southern Baptist, one interviewee who 
identifies as a Jewish Quaker, and four conscientious tax objectors who stated that they 
belonged to no church and were not religious.  However, these four conscientious tax 
objectors did not identify as agnostic or atheist when asked.   
Finally, it should be noted the majority of conscientious tax objectors whom I 
interviewed were women. This data set should in no way serve to suggest that the large 
majority of conscientious tax objectors are women.  Simply, I believe that as many of my 
initial contacts were women, and I myself am a woman, I was more often referred to 
women.   
 
4.3. Observations  
4.3.1. Introduction to Conscientious Tax Objection 
A consistent theme during most interviews was how the interviewee became 
aware of conscientious tax objection.  Conscientious tax objector #8 shared that, “People 
have concrete role models in their own personal life, and you are influenced by contact; 
that is how it happened to me 6 years ago” (Contentious tax object #8, personal 
communication, March 20, 2012).   Consistently, throughout the interviews, the 
conscientious tax objectors shared that a friend, family member, or personal hero was a 
conscientious tax objector before they themselves joined the movement.  No 
conscientious tax objector claimed to have discovered the idea of tax resistance on her/his 
own.   
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4.3.2. Theological Support for Conscientious Tax Objection  
During my interviews, I found a consistent theme when speaking with 
conscientious tax objectors who were in favor of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund 
Act: a spiritual identification closely aligned with a Christological belief system. 
However, not everyone identified her/himself as “Christian”.  When asked, I heard 
responses ranging from I am a practicing Roman Catholic; I am a follower of the 
nonviolent Jesus; I am a Christo-humanist; I attend a Friends meeting and I find comfort 
in the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth; I am an Evangelical Christian; I am a Methodist, 
etc.  Many conscientious tax objectors cited the teachings of Jesus in the Gospels as the 
rationale behind their tax resistance.  As I interviewed more conscientious tax objectors, 
I decided to look deeper into the doctrinal teachings that were often cited to justify tax 
resistance. 
 While the passages that I researched are all Christian, I do not want to suggest 
that it is only individuals following Christian traditions who practice religious 
conscientious tax objection. To make that claim would be false.  During my field 
research, I met with Muslim, Baha’ia, Buddhist, Jewish, atheist, agnostic, and secular 
conscientious tax objectors.  I, also, formally interviewed a few conscientious tax 
objectors who cited faith traditions other than Christian but did voice faith 
considerations as their main reason for engaging in religious conscientious tax 
objection.  These religious conscientious tax objectors cited teachings from their own 
faith traditions as the rationale behind the decision to resist taxes. With more time and 
resources I would gladly discuss other traditions.   However, in the absence, I focused 
discussion on the Christian teachings cited by religious conscientious tax objectors.  
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 For most Christians, the morality of the just war has been accepted with little 
questioning.  For centuries, many have fought in the current “Caesar’s” wars with little 
hesitation.  Prior to Constantine’s adoption of Christianity in AD 311, Christians were 
taught that war and violence were never justifiable.  Christians refused to participate or 
support such violence.  These early Christians followed the nonviolent Jesus.  They 
accepted the teachings of agape love and lived nonviolent lives. (González, 
2010)(Pohlsander, 2004) 
 Citing Matthew 17:24-27 as a Christian justification to conscientious tax 
objection, Kaufman (1969) explores the conversation between the Apostle Peter and 
Jesus around the topic of whether or not Jesus paid the Temple Tax.  Kaufman argues 
that Jesus’ analogy between the question of from whom do kings collect taxes and the 
question of if Jesus pays the two-drachma Temple Tax demonstrates Jesus’ belief that the 
“the inward attitude of the spirit . . . was incompatible with the compulsory legal payment 
of a tax for worship” (p.33).  Further, Kaufman notes that as the political situations of the 
early Christians changed, the meaning of that story probably changed as well.  He 
specifically notes that the need to question compulsory taxes was very present when the 
Temple Tax became a Roman Tax. (p. 34).   
 The often quoted passage, “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to 
God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22: 15-22 and Luke 20:20-26) has great 
importance in the conflict between the freedom of conscience and required taxation.  In 
the parable, the Pharisees and Herodians mean to trick Jesus when they ask the 
question, “Is it lawful to pay taxes to the emperor, or not?” (Matthew 22:17)  
According to Kaufman (1969, p. 36), a simple yes or no answer would have trapped 
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Jesus.  Instead, Jesus socratically answers the question with the request to show him a 
coin.  Ostensibly, Jesus did not possess a coin because as the Roman denarius bore the 
image of Caesar to do such would violate the Second Commandment.
41
 However, 
apparently one of the questioners had a coin, because Jesus asks, “Whose head is this, 
and whose title?”  They answered, “The emperor’s,” then he said to them, “Give 
therefore to the emperor the things that are the emperor’s, and to God the things that 
are God’s” (Matthew 22: 20-22).  Arthur Harvey, as Kaufman (1969) writes, believes 
that Jesus was simultaneously giving two answers.  “For those whose loyalty was 
already given to Caesar as shown by their possession of Caesar’s coin involving 
Caesar’s claim to be God, well, of course they had an obligation to pay the tax.  For 
those whose lives were oriented toward God, they would not owe Caesar anything” (p. 
36).       
 
4.3.3. Personal Direct Contact With Victims of American Military Industrial Complex 
 Every conscientious tax objector, whom I interviewed, without exception, stated 
that s/he had a personal experience with the victims of the United States of America’s 
military industrial complex.  Each conscientious tax objector, in her/his own way, stated 
that meeting and spending time with foreign civilians who had experienced negative 
effects from direct or indirect contact with the United States’ military industrial complex 
was a major reason for her/his engagement in tax resistance.   
 Each conscientious tax objector had a different and unique first hand experience.  
While giving a synopsis of each would be interesting, in the interest of being concise, I 
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 “You shall not make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is in heaven above, or that 
is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth” (Exodus 20:4). 
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have decided to share the story that conscientious tax objector #33 told to me.  
Conscientious tax objector #33, a female African-American Southern Baptist, spent one 
year as an English instructor in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestinian Refugees’ (U.N.R.W.A.) Dheisheh Camp, in Occupied Bethlehem, Palestine.  
Conscientious tax objector #33 shared that, as a Southern Baptist, she initially began her 
work at the camp with more of a tendency to support the Israeli political cause in the 
Israeli/Palestinian Crisis.  However, after a few short weeks, living and working in the 
refugee camp, conscientious tax objector #33 began to understand the ramifications of the 
United States government’s 30 billion dollar annual support in military aid for the Israeli 
Occupation of Palestine (Reubner, 2011).  Conscientious tax objector #33 said that living 
with a third generation refugee family in Dheisheh Refugee Camp changed not only her 
beliefs about the Israeli/Palestinian Crisis but also her personal financial support of the 
United States military industrial complex.  After returning to the United States, 
Conscientious tax objector #33 became involved with local peace organizations.  
Through her involvement in the peace communities, she became acquainted with 
conscientious tax objectors.  Conscientious tax objector #33 has been a conscientious tax 
objector for one year.  
 
4.3.4. Reactions to Penalties, Interest, and Punishments 
 I specifically asked each interviewee about her/his personal repercussions from 
resisting taxes.  From my initial informational interviews and research, I learned that no 
one conscientious tax objector’s story regarding penalties, interest, and punishments was 
exactly like another’s.   In deciding to engage in resistance, the new conscientious tax 
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objector has no guarantee of “what will happen” to her/him after s/he engages in the 
resistance.  With varying degrees of emotion, most conscientious tax objectors did, 
however, state a high level of anxiety after receiving the first, of many, correspondences 
from the I.R.S. regarding the resistance.  During the course of the interviews, I heard 
from conscientious tax objectors who had had wages garnished, Social Security Benefits 
garnished, bank accounts seized, had received phone calls from I.R.S. agents at work and 
home, had received in-person visits from I.R.S. agents at her/his primary residence, and 
had vehicles and homes seized and auctioned.  However, I also spoke with six 
conscientious tax objectors who currently do not file and have, to date, not received any 
communication from the I.R.S. regarding the non-filed years.  
 
4.3.5. Why a Particular Method of Resistance 
 Most interviewees confirmed my assumption that phone tax resistance is the 
“gate-way” method.  The ten conscientious tax objectors who had never resisted phone 
taxes stated their sole phone line was a cell-phone at the time of initial resistance and, 
thus, phone tax resistance was not applicable to them, as cell phone carriers no longer 
impose the excise tax.  Phone tax resistance aside, no conscientious tax objector whom I 
interviewed practiced the same exact method as any other interviewed conscientious tax 
objector.  As each conscientious tax objector’s method is different, I will describe the 
methods of two conscientious tax objectors on opposite ends of the method spectrum, 
resist and refuse, as a way to highlight the decision-making experience of a conscientious 
tax objector.     
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 Conscientious tax objector # 8, a university professor, has resisted taxes in one 
form or another for more than 35 years.  As a full-time university professor, 
conscientious tax objector #8, earns an income well above the taxable line.  However, by 
practicing W-4 and phone tax resistance is able to withhold a significant portion of 
her/his tax obligation every year.  However, for the last 16 years, conscientious tax 
objector #8 has had wages garnished and a bank account seized.  When asked why s/he 
continues to engage in conscientious tax resistance, conscientious tax objector #8 replied, 
“Ultimately the government will get the money one way or another, that’s not the point.  
Rather, I am not voluntarily handing it over.  The government compels me to participate 
in paying for murder.  Yes, I could retire or get a lower paying job and reduce my 
income.  I could do that, but I don’t want to do that.  I like teaching; it is my purpose” 
(Conscientious tax object #8, personal communication, March 20, 2012).   
 In contrast, conscientious tax objector # 30 refuses all federal income taxes and 
has refused for 10 years.  Conscientious tax objector #30 holds a J.D. from Harvard and a 
Ph.D. from University of Chicago.  In order to successfully refuse, conscientious tax 
objector #30 has drastically reorganized her/his lifestyle.  Conscientious tax objector #30 
does not own a home, car, or maintain a bank account.  Conscientious tax objector #30 
believes that the I.R.S. claims s/he owes more than $500,000.00 in back taxes, interest, 
and penalties.  S/he does not know the exact amount because, “I no longer open the 
notices; I recycle them.  I’m not going to pay, I don’t have anything for them to seize and 
I don’t earn enough money for them to garnish.  I refuse to participate in war”  
(Conscientious tax objector #30, personal communication, March 19, 2012).  
Conscientious tax objector #30 is the only conscientious tax objector whom I interviewed 
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who stated that s/he is upper middle class and is a refuser.  I asked for clarification of this 
response because it seemed impossible to be upper middle class and continue to refuse.  
Conscientious tax objector #30 stated that even though s/he no longer earns a wage that, 
“allows membership in that class, by luxury of my birth, I received the best education 
available and I could earn more if I chose to earn more.  I am undeniably upper-middle 
class” (Conscientious tax objector#30, personal communication, March 19, 2012). 
 Conscientious tax objector #1 has refused all taxes for more than 30 years.  When 
asked why s/he chose the refusal method, conscientious tax objector #1 replied,  
I realized that my neighbors didn’t have food and that the children would be 
remarkable if they made it though their teenage years, and that people in my 
neighborhood were sleeping in abandoned buildings. There’s no way I was going 
to go to a teaching job and spend much of my teaching day trying to teach 
youngsters about opposition, radical opposition to nuclear weaponry and then take 
a third of my income and then pay for nuclear weapons and the rest of it. It wasn’t 
even a question once I realized that I didn’t have to pay those taxes. I never will 
pay those taxes and since the day that I first made that determination, there hasn’t 
been a doubt in my mind. I will never pay federal income tax. (Conscientious tax 
objector #1, personal communication, January 4, 2012)  
Further, conscientious tax objector #1 said that becoming a war-tax refuser,  “. . . affects 
one’s personality.   I developed an edge, and I had to learn the skill, more the art form of 
how to engage in refusal and resistance without creating enmity or deepening enmity”  
(Conscientious tax objector #1, personal communication, January 4, 2012) 
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4.3.6. Reactions by Non Conscientious Tax Objector Family Members and Friends  
 Most interviews included a lengthy description of a disappointing interaction with 
a family or friend after the conscientious tax objector became public with her/his 
resistance.  Some conscientious tax objectors encountered upset friends and family, 
others encountered anger and abuse from family and friends, while others encountered 
divorce and shunning. Most conscientious tax objectors shared stories of multi-year long 
conversations and multiple intervention sessions by family and friends attempting to 
convince the conscientious tax objector of the errors of her/his way.  While most 
conscientious tax objectors described eventual reconciliation with their family and 
friends, a few conscientious tax objectors shared narratives of permanent dissolutions of 
marriage and/or platonic relationships.  
 One such dissolution of a marriage involved conscientious tax objector #2.  
Conscientious tax objector #2 was married to a fellow Quaker for more than twenty years 
before her husband filed for divorce.  Her husband cited her, “obsession with breaking 
the law” (Conscientious tax objector #2, personal communication, February 10, 2012) as 
their main difference of opinion.  Furthermore, after their divorce became final, her ex-
husband often tried to use her methods of resistance as evidence that she was an unfit 
parent.  Conscientious tax objector #2 told me that these accusations, while hurtful and 
upsetting, often gave her strength to continue her resistance.  Conscientious tax objector 
#2 said,  
Knowing that my ex-husband believed that it was more moral to pay for the 
murder of innocent children than it is to break an unjust law gave me the strength 
to continue to fight our custody battle.  I didn’t want him to be the sole parental 
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influence on our children.  I worried about how he would raise them.  
(Conscientious tax objector #2, personal communication, February 10, 2012)  
 
 4.3.7. Reactions to the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act 
 Perhaps the greatest variation among the interviewed conscientious tax objectors 
was how each answered the question about registering as a conscientious tax objector if 
the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act became law.  Of the 42 interviews, 20 
answered in the affirmative, four answered maybe, and 18 gave varying degrees of a 
negative response.  Among the 20 who answered yes with no qualifiers, two 
conscientious tax objectors, #15 and #24, are currently not only conscientious tax 
objectors but also refusers.  The reasoning behind the opinions highlights the different 
factions within the movement.  Below I compare the differing approaches to the 
Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act as reported in the interviews.   I have grouped 
the responses by positive and negative, with the former meaning that the conscientious 
tax objector would register if the option became available and the latter meaning the 
opposite.  
Positive  
 For the interviewees who answered in the affirmative, a major theme was present 
in their answers.  Each conscientious tax objector cited advantages of a peace tax fund as 
their main rationale of support. The advantages can be grouped as follows: restoring 
freedom of religion as protected in the First Amendment; creating tremendous 
educational opportunities; making meaningful step towards raising national 
consciousness; and facilitating the passage of similar legislation in other countries. 
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Many conscientious tax objectors stated that the restoration of the freedom of 
religion is one of the very “first freedoms” (Conscientious tax objector #23, personal 
communication, January 5, 2012) and is a “cornerstone of a democratic society” 
(Conscientious tax objector # 8, personal communication, March 20, 2012).  Further, 
some conscientious tax objectors said that the First Amendment should protect 
individuals whose religious or moral convictions forbid participation in war, whether 
physical or financial.  For these reasons, many conscientious tax objectors believe that 
the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act is worth supporting. 
Conscientious tax objector # 31 cited the educational opportunities as reason to 
support.  Once the Fund becomes law, information about the availability of conscientious 
tax objector status would accompany all income tax form publications.  This added 
visibility would provide a much-needed educational opportunity for the movement.  
Conscientious tax objector # 42, a registered conscientious objector, stated that, “as 
information about CO’s [conscientious objectors] cause guys to weigh their conscience, 
so will information about The Fund for tax stuff.” (Conscientious tax objector #42, 
personal communication, January 10, 2012) 
The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act would provide an opportunity to 
quantifiably measure the public’s opinion of war.  As conscientious tax objector #40 
stated, “. . . since the number of conscientious tax objectors will be reported to Congress 
every year, we will have data to substantiate our statements.  The Bill provides for direct 
feedback to our elected representatives and is another tool to hold them accountable.” 
(Conscientious tax objector #40, personal communication, January 9, 2012) 
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Conscientious tax objector #13, who works for an international progressive 
monthly magazine, said that passing the bill would be a “watershed event” 
(Conscientious tax objector#13, personal communication, February 5, 2012).  If passed, 
the United States Government would be acknowledging that, “its citizens have a just 
claim to freedom of conscience” (Conscientious objector #13, personal communication, 
February 5, 2012). Furthermore, conscientious tax objector #13 suggests that this event 
may provide the catalyst for additional countries to pass similar bills.   
Negative 
 For the interviewees who answered in the negative, a major theme present in 
their answers was that the bill is too weak.  Most non-supporting conscientious tax 
objectors stated that a peace tax fund, especially as it is written today, would not bring 
enough change.  The disadvantages or reasons for being against the bill are as follows: is 
no more than a shell game; is an easy way out for people who are fearful of not paying 
taxes; is written in a way that alienates non religious conscientious tax objectors; is 
allowing the government the sole decision as to who is a conscientious objector; is 
seeking permission from an inherently corrupt system; and is sending the wrong message 
about conscientious tax objectors.   
“Where will the money go?”  This question was, without exception, the first 
answer I received when I questioned why the interviewee did not support the Religious 
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act.  Additionally, conscientious tax objector #1 stated that, 
“[it] will not change anything, it’s a Shell Game” (Conscientious tax objector#1, personal 
communication, December 4, 2011). These conscientious tax objectors, who do not 
support the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, claimed that the fund only draws 
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attention away from the problem.  Conscientious tax objector #7 explained in a detailed 
e-mail why s/he would never support the fund.  Conscientious tax objector #7 said,  
The only way that it would affect military spending is if the general fund becomes 
smaller than the amount spent on the military. If that happens, the government 
would either have to borrow money, borrow from the Peace Fund or reduce 
military spending. But it gets better, because what matters is how many people are 
necessary for anything to change.  If the total percentage of peace tax people isn’t 
more than the percentage of the budget spent on the military, then nothing will 
happen.  I’m sorry, but I don’t think that 50% of Americans are opposed to war in 
any form.  So, I don’t think that this change will ever happen.  This bill will never 
work.  (Conscientious tax objector #7, personal communication, December 20, 
2011)  
Furthermore, conscientious tax objector #16 stated that if the percentage of Americans 
was large enough to make a difference in the budget, as conscientious tax objector #7 
explained, the bill is itself redundant.  Conscientious tax objector #16 said if that many 
Americans were against war in any form, “We would all already either be living 
productive and sane lives in a peaceful tomorrow of harmony and understanding, or 
living in barbed-wire collective labor camps under the control of our foreign overlords, 
depending on your brand of speculative fiction.”  (Conscientious tax objector #16, 
personal communication, January 15, 2012)  
Regarding the alienation of non-religious conscientious objectors, conscientious 
tax objector #9 said that, “Many resisters [conscientious tax objectors] are not religious, 
so when the Peace Tax Fund Bill was rewritten to align more closely with the First 
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Amendment right to freedom and religious expression, they felt more alienated from it”  
(Conscientious tax objector #9, personal communication, March 21, 2012). Furthermore, 
conscientious tax objector #21, who reported having no religious affiliation, said that 
resisting has nothing to do with religion.  “If it passes, I think less people will register 
than you expect.  I won’t register because I’m not religious and I’m not going to lie just 
so that the government won’t garnish my wages” (Conscientious tax objector #21, 
personal communication, January 4, 2012). 
Regarding giving the government the power to decide who is an appropriate 
conscientious objector, conscientious tax objector #9 shared that, “Any process that gives 
government bodies the power to decide who is a conscientious tax objector will create a 
process that forces people to resist anyway.  The problems military personnel have today 
is, finding out about conscientious objector (CO) options and applying for a CO 
discharge bear out this fear”(Conscientious tax objector #9, personal communication 
March 21, 2012). 
Among conscientious tax objectors who support an anarchist philosophy and 
lifestyle, the idea of seeking permission from an inherently corrupt system, in their 
opinion, is not appropriate.  Conscientious tax objector #12, a long-time Catholic Worker 
said, 
We at the Los Angeles Catholic Worker do not pay any form of income tax, nor 
do we associate ourselves with the government by filing as a 501 (c)(3) non-profit 
organization.  The 501 would involve a corporate hierarchy in our organization, as 
well as acknowledgment from the government.  We are anarchists.  We do not 
agree with the government in general.  Thus, I don’t believe that I would apply to 
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the federal government for approval to not pay my taxes.  It will work for some, 
but probably not me. (Conscientious tax objector #12, personal communication, 
February 10, 2012)  
 
Further, conscientious tax objector #1, another Catholic Worker, stated that for more than 
30 years s/he has not paid taxes.  “I would never even think about registering with the 
government for permission. I gave myself permission more than 30 years ago to live an 
appropriate life.  Registering with the government is against my moral conscience.” 
(Conscientious tax objector #1, personal communication, January 3, 2012)  
I heard many different versions of the statement, if conscientious tax objectors 
accept the bill the public will form the wrong opinion about the movement.  Some 
conscientious tax objectors say that compromising on the bill suggests that they were not 
particularly conscientious at all, but can be easily bought-off by symbolic concessions 
(Conscientious tax objector # 36, personal communication, April 1, 2012), or that 
compromising on the bill may suggest that conscientious tax objectors are only willing to 
check a box on a form but not willing to live with the ramifications of their actions 
(Conscientious tax objector # 16, personal communication, January 15, 2012).  I also 
heard that those conscientious tax objectors who are willing to compromise desire 
validation by their government that says they are conscientious (Conscientious tax 
objector #17, personal communication, January 19, 2012).  
 
4.4. Themes That Emerge  
One of my initial questions can now be answered affirmatively. Are the factions 
within the conscientious tax objector movement contributing to the ongoing current conflict 
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between freedom of conscience and required taxation?  Yes. While the conflict between 
freedom of conscience and required taxation remains regardless of the nature of the 
factionalism within the movement, the factions are one part of the sustaining conflict.   
Relevant case law, the history of the conscientious tax objector movement and the 
factions within the movement are all contributing to the ongoing current conflict.    
Accordingly, two major themes emerge about the conflict.  The history of the 
conscientious objector (CO) movement reveals major implications for the conscientious tax 
objector movement.  The CO movement’s trajectory to date may provide a successful 
template for transforming the conflict between freedom of conscience and required taxation.  
Using relevant case law and statutes from the conscientious objector movement current 
conscientious tax objectors have abundant data to substantiate their claim that protection of 
this religious freedom, through judicial and legislative actions, will not necessarily open the 
proverbial floodgates to the protection of additional religious freedoms.   
 The dialectical conflict within the conscientious tax objector movement cannot be 
solved; but it can be transformed.  The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act becoming 
law may be one possible transformative agent for this conflict.  If registering, as a 
conscientious tax objector was an option, the conversation with in the movement might 
shift.  However, if the current homogenous socio-economic demographic of 
conscientious tax objectors changes, the movement may also be transformed.  
Furthermore, the outcomes of the current court cases of Elizabeth Boardman and Cindy 
Sheehan may transform the movement through their outcomes.  A shift in dialogue from 
positional to peacebuilding or the superordinate goal, which Christie, Tint, Wagner, and 
Winter (2008) define as, “(the) shared goal that parties in conflict can only attain through 
mutual effort”, may ultimately result in the movement’s greatest transformation.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Conscientious tax objectors, through their efforts to protect freedom of 
conscience, are participating in a movement which is subject to a complex set of 
interactions between individual conscientious tax objectors, government, both the judicial 
and the legislative branches, and society within the United States.  Through these 
interactions, conscientious tax objectors are part of an ongoing legitimizing effort to 
protect religious freedom.  Two of the most prominent examples are individual court 
cases and The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act.   
 Many people have asked how change will happen.  I offer that change happens 
when a coalition of concerned people coalesce into a movement.  I agree with Dr. Cornel 
West who suggests that when a group of people marches together towards freedom, an 
in-group is born to overcome injustice.  When the group grows and welcomes those who 
once were the other and now become part of the group, change happens. When an in-
group starts to accept members of the out-group, a new group forms and becomes a 
coalition. When the coalition continues to accept new members and continues to adapt, a 
new movement is formed (Smiley, T. & West, C., 2012).  In this respect, change is 
happening.  The conscientious objectors are part of a movement to overcome perceived 
injustice.  
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5.1. Lessons From the Case Study  
Pacifism is often thought of as a synonym for resisting war.  Increasingly, the 
methods of war resistance are engaging with the methods of peacebuilding. Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu describes the concept of Ubuntu as, I am because we are, and we are 
because we belong (Battle, 1997).   I believe that conscientious tax objectors would do 
well to remember what Tutu suggests that we are all connected. We exist in communities 
where an individual’s well-being is connected to the well-being of others.  While 
members of the movement disagree on the merits of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax 
Fund Act, they still remain part of the conscientious tax objection movement. There is a 
conflict between the conscientious tax objectors who are willing to compromise and work 
towards a conciliatory outcome, and those who do not support the Religious Freedom 
Peace Tax Fund Act.  While this conflict exists, the lack of dialogue between the groups 
is fracturing the movement.  My research suggests that unless the various factions within 
the conscientious tax objector movement enter into a consensus-building dialogue, 
conscientious tax objection will remain a mere symbolic method of pacifism rather than a 
powerful tool in the art of peacebuilding.  
 
5.2. New Directions For Conscientious Tax Objectors? 
 Over the course of my research, I began to question the efficacy of the current 
conscientious tax objection campaign.  While engaging in the interviews, I found myself 
increasingly perplexed that the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund has not found more 
legislative success.  Perhaps the conscientious tax objectors might achieve better results 
by engaging in a process of re-evaluating their goals, tactics, tools, and, most importantly, 
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their interests.  My research has led me to ask how can the conscientious tax objectors be 
more effective in their negotiations with judges, legislatures, other conscientious tax 
objectors, and, ultimately, with the general public?  I offer these suggestions not as 
critiques, but rather with the desire that my commentary might be of use to a movement 
that I respect and admire. 
I question the efficacy of the current legal methods of individual conscientious tax 
objectors.  From the perspective of the judicial system, the legal precedent is clear.  The 
courts consistently cite the Lee decision: the broad public interest in maintaining a sound 
tax system is of such importance that religious beliefs in conflict with the payment of 
taxes provide no basis for refusing to pay.  The conscientious tax objectors cite their 
freedom of conscience as a main interest in continuing to engage with the judicial system.  
However, if the court continues to maintain strict adherence to the holding in Lee, is it 
possible that instead of garnering judicial support, the conscientious tax objectors are 
angering the courts?  Perhaps the conscientious tax objectors would cite Against 
Settlement, by Owen Fiss as their rationale for continuing to bring individual cases to the 
courts.  Fiss, (1984) states that, “ . . . we turn to the courts because we need to, not 
because of some quirk in our personalities”(p. 1089).  However, I see another option - 
changing the law. 
This thesis illustrates the historical example of the conscientious objector 
movement.  While the numerous court cases regarding conscientious objectors may 
increase the perception that allowances were won through judicial battles, in reality, the 
primary rights were achieved through legislative action.  The precedent exists for the 
Legislative branch to protect an individual’s religious freedom.  Why has there been little 
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traction for protecting the conscientious tax objector form of religious freedom?  My 
research suggests that the fractured nature of the movement may be responsible.  Many 
conscientious tax objectors take the position that the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund 
Act does not do enough and, thus, is not worth supporting.  I wonder if the movement 
utilized a different negotiation approach, would more religious freedoms be protected? 
Fisher, Ury, and Patton, in Getting to Yes (2011), suggest that distributive 
bargaining, in most circumstances, is inferior to integrative bargaining.  With cooperation 
and a focus on interests rather than positions, they argue, in most situations the pie can 
almost always be increased and outcomes can be created that benefit both sides.   I would 
suggest that since the conscientious tax objectors have relationships with one another, 
that they most likely want to maintain, they would do well to engage in an internal 
negotiation process.  I believe that the current zero-sum nature of the internal dialogue is 
prohibiting legislative movement with regards to protecting this religious freedom.   
If the differing perspectives within the movement would engage in a consensus- 
building dialogue, the results may mitigate the current effects of Autistic Hostility on the 
movement.  Autistic Hostility, according to Deutsch (2000), is the breaking off of contact 
and communication with the other.  This breakdown in communication is perpetuated 
because there is little, if any, opportunity for the sides to learn that their misunderstanding 
or misjudgments may not be based in reality.   While there is little communication 
between the two sides, there exist few opportunities to resolve the conflict.  Direct 
communication is needed for the two parties to change their opinions.  Without 
communication the conflict becomes more intractable.  Each side views the other with 
more hostility, which leads to greater intractability.  If the conscientious tax objector 
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movement would engage in a more consensus- building dialogue it would mitigate the 
impediment of Autistic Hostility in their reaching their goals.   
 
5.3. Implications 
 This thesis has offered specific observations about the conscientious tax objector 
movement in the United States of America.  Resistance is often cited as a powerful tactic 
in nonviolent direct action campaigns because of its major role in publicizing many of the 
most egregious enduring conflicts.   Many conscientious objectors believe that the 
government is illegally encroaching on religious freedoms.  I have suggested that the 
current lack of legal protections for conscientious tax objectors may be directly related to 
the movement’s positional zero-sum approach to internal and external negotiations.   
Further, I have offered that while remaining true to their core values, the individual 
conscientious tax objectors would do well to develop different methods and strategies of 
nonviolent direct actions.  These conclusions have implications for the wider pacifist 
movement as well as other minority religious groups.   
 First, Martin Luther King Jr., while introducing the slogan for the Montgomery 
Bus Boycott: “Thou shalt not requite violence with violence,” made a speech on 5 
December 1955, in which he said, “Our method will be that of persuasion not coercion. 
We will only say to the people, ‘Let your conscience be your guide’ ”(King, 1958, p. 61-
64).  The conscientious tax objectors should heed Dr. King’s message and engage in 
more persuasive methods.  If their current nonviolent direct action campaign continues to 
meet with little success, my research leads me to question the movement’s future. While 
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individual activists will continue to engage in her/his own conscientious tax objection, I 
doubt the movement will gain the new adherents needed for growth.   
 Second, the sociologist Erving Goffman (1963) describes stigma as the 
circumstance in which a person is disqualified from full social acceptance.  Conscientious 
tax objectors are already marginalized by virtue of their status as dissenters and 
conscientious tax objectors.  However, the Court’s position in Lee, that broad public 
interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such importance that religious beliefs in 
conflict are not protected, compromises their status even further. With stigma, Goffman 
(1963) believes shame becomes a central possibility. Individuals who hold these same 
religious and moral beliefs may decide to not engage in conscientious tax objection 
because of shame and fear.  Moreover, how many conscientious tax objectors, 
constrained by shame, are not able to be effective spokespeople for the movement? 
 Finally, can the current name of the bill, The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund 
Act, constructed around the religious framework ever be a tool toward a potential 
compromise?  This study uncovered enough anomalies, between the number of practicing 
religious conscientious tax objectors and the number who are in support of the Religious 
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, to lead me to posit that the current law, as written, may 
draw more new conscientious tax objectors to the movement rather than engaging current 
conscientious tax objectors.  
 The use of informal interviews allowed me to develop a case study that begins to 
show the complexities of conscientious tax objection demographics.  One of the more 
surprising observations was the level of higher education among those interviewed.  
According to a US Census report for the year 2009, 27.9 percent of the United States 
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population held a Bachelor’s Degree or more (Ryan, C & Siebens, J, 2012).  Of the 42 
interviewees for this case study, 100 percent held a Bachelor’s Degree or more.  This 
would suggest that the movement is an elite group.   While the high level of education 
among conscientious tax objectors itself is not cause for concern, the group-think elitism 
may be.  One such example from my research is the often-repeated option that an 
individual can easily reduce her/his income so as to not have a federal tax obligation.  For 
a well-educated person of privilege, the possibility of reducing one’s income purposefully 
to reduce one’s federal tax obligation may seem without much risk.  However, for a 
person identified as a member of the permanent poor class, the idea of choosing to reduce 
income may be baffling.  The conscientious tax objectors who argue against the Religious 
Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act and instead offer the option of poverty may not understand 
that this alternative may be hurtful, harmful, and offensive to the less privileged.  The 
apparent lack of diversity among conscientious tax objectors may be the cause or may be 
the effect of the message. Not withstanding, the outcome is the same – freedom of 
conscience remains an unprotected right.  
  These issues aside, freedom of conscience versus required taxation remains a 
conflict within the United States.  The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act is 
constructing a narrative unique among coalitions within the social justice movement.  
The Act’s possibility to protect the religious freedom of conscientious tax objectors might 
stimulate further preservation of other freedoms.  However, its current role as a divisive 
element within the conscientious tax objector movement may be a catalyst for further 
divisions within the social justice movement as a whole.  Ultimately, the legacy of 
enacting the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act will rest on its ability to stand up to 
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the scrutiny of empirical evidence. That will have to wait for the book to be written. Stay 
tuned. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE’S U.S. FEDERAL BUDGET 
PIE CHART, 2012 FISCAL YEAR 
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THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PEACE TAX FUND ACT 
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APPENDIX C 
 
HANG UP ON WAR CARDS 
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APPENDIX D 
 
IRS PROPERTY SEIZURES AGAINST  
CONSCIENTIOUS TAX OBJECTORS 
 
 
 
 
SOURCES: The Peacemaker, Peacemakers, 1949–1992; Handbook on the Nonpayment of War Taxes, Peacemakers, 1983; Tax Talk, 
National War Tax Resistance, 1969–1975; Center Peace, Center on Law & Pacifism, 1981–1985; Conscience, Conscience and 
Military Tax Campaign, 1982–1994; Network News, 1984–1994, NWTRCC; More Than a Paycheck, 1994 to present, NWTRCC 
 
(NWTRCC, 2012)  
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